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This Article advocates the restoration of the natural law1 to our copyright
jurisprudence. Although eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers were keenly
aware of copyright's natural law dimensions,' modern copyright jurisprudence
tends to view copyright strictly as a means of achieving economic efficiency.3
This approach finds support in United States Supreme Court pronouncements
which state that copyright exists solely to provide economic incentives for the
production of useful works.4
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I. Defining the natural law is a difficult task, and any definition will be incomplete. However, in this
Article, I am referring to the jurisprudential tradition which links the law to universal principles of truth or
morality. This tradition contains at least two identifiable limits on the reach of human law. The first, which is
quasi-scientific in outlook, recognizes "that there are inherent characteristics in human beings and other animate
things as well as in the physical world and in social structures. These inherent characteristics determine their
behavior and establish substantial limits on changes that can be made with regard to them." W.M. REISMAN &
A.M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE. UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 170 (1987). See also G.W. PATON, JU-
RISPRUDENCE 80 (2d ed. 1951) ("... [J]us Naturale [natural law] was the fundamental basis of every legal
system, for, however much conventional law may change, rules based on nature are beyond the power of man.").
The second limit, which is humanist in outlook, holds that all human laws must contain some intrinsic moral
value. Thus, laws which maintain no connection with universal principles of morality are invalid. See L. WEINREE,
NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 1-7 (1987) (describing natural law as "a theory about the nature of being, the
human condition in particular"); A.P. D'ENTREVES. NATURAL LAW, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
116 (1952) ("The notion of natural law partakes at the same time of a legal and of a moral character.").
2. See G. CURTIS. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 1-19 (1847); 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 298, 306-08, 314-15 (1827 & photo. reprint 1984); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES*405-06.
Briefly stated, copyright is sometimes seen as the legal vindication of a person's inherent right to property in the
fruits of her labor. Thus, the author of a book is entitled to copyright therein as a matter of fundamental justice.
This theory is the descendant of English and Roman natural law doctrines which based property on labor and
possession. See infra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659 (1988); Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 78 AM. ECON. Assoc. PAPERS &
PROC. 421 (1966); Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989);
Mcnell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045
(1989). See also Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1435 (1989) ("Most of the literature discussing the desirability
of intellectual property systems has focused on economics ... ").
4. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112
(1984):
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public
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Under this view, copyright is necessary because in its absence those inter-
ested in using the author's work would simply copy the work instead of buying
it from the author.5 Authors would then find their economic returns too small to
justify the costs of authorship. In such a situation authors might not produce,
and social welfare would presumably suffer.6
To remedy this problem, economic theory supports granting authors copy-
right in their works. However, those rights are necessarily limited in scope, be-
cause copyright imposes costs on society in exchange for the benefits of induced
creative activity. First, the owner of copyright rights will charge a monopoly
price for her work. The number of people who gain access to the work will
therefore decrease.7  Second, copyright raises the production cost of future
works, because it prohibits borrowing from existing works and makes it more
difficult for future authors to create.8 Thus, the optimal degree of copyright
protection is that amount which maximizes the difference between the benefits
of induced creative activity and the costs of increased authors' rights.9 The ap-
peal of this approach is plainly evident, for it apparently provides a method for
prescribing the assignment of property rights through copyright. Authors re-
ceive only those rights which promote economic efficiency.' This can be seen in
the economic interpretation of major copyright concepts such as "originality"
and the "idea/expression dichotomy.""'
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired.
In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954), the Court wrote as follows:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts."
See also Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washing-
ton, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1981).
5. Throughout this Article the word "author" is used in its broad copyright sense.
6. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 328. In economic terms, an inefficiency, or "market failure," has
occurred. See Menell, supra note 3, at 1058-60.
7. Fisher, supra note 3, at 1700-02.
8. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 332.
9. Fisher, supra note 3, at 1717; Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 326. This economic statement captures
the conventional adage that copyright balances incentives for production against the need for free access to works.
10. In other words, copyright should be used to correct market failures, but only to the extent that the
economic benefits of doing so exceed the economic costs. See Mcneil, supra note 3, at 1058.
I1. These concepts are embodied in our present copyright code at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Together they
define the existence and scope of copyright in a given work. Originality provides the basic requirement for
copyrightability by providing that only "original works of authorship" are eligible for protection. 17 U.S.C. §
102(a) (1988). Copyright therefore does not protect works which lack minimal creativity or are simply copies of
other preexisting works. See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986) (parts numbering
system not original); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976)
(copy of preexisting work lacks originality); Magic Mktg. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, 634 F. Supp. 769
(W.D. Pa. 1986) (advertising phrases on envelope lack originality). See also infra notes 94-118 and accompanying
text.
However, the mere fact that a work is an "original" does not mean that copyright prohibits all borrowing
from that work. Instead, the idea/expression dichotomy permits some borrowing from every copyrighted work by
specifically excluding ideas from an author's property. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Thus, even though a book is
protected by copyright, a future author is free to borrow the ideas embodied in the book. Only the book's expres-
sions remain protected from copying. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (idea of double entry bookkeeping not
protected by copyright); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.), cert.
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Since originality defines the works eligible for copyright protection, its eco-
nomic interpretation becomes an exercise in determining whether extending
copyright to a given class of works promotes social welfare.' 2 Similarly, applica-
tion of the idea/expression dichotomy becomes an economic cost-benefit calcu-
lation. If authors need more incentive to produce creative works, then fewer
facets of works should be considered ideas, and more facets should be consid-
ered expressions.' 3 If society needs greater access to works, the converse is
true.14 This vision suggests the use of economic analysis to strike a reasonable
balance between the interests of authors and the interests of society.
Unfortunately,' 5 this vision alone cannot adequately guide the development
of copyright law. Instead of maintaining a balance between the interests of au-
thors and society, modern courts and legislatures have used copyright to steadily
expand authors' rights. For example, a nineteenth century copyright plaintiff
could prove infringement only by showing that the defendant had borrowed the
literal features of the plaintiff's work. Thus, a plaintiff trying to enforce copy-
right in a book would have to show at least some appropriation of the literal
text and perhaps a good deal more. Mere borrowing of a plot or theme would
not be sufficient.16 By contrast, a present day plaintiff finds a growing number
of influential decisions which suggest that practically any borrowing from a
copyrighted work may constitute copyright infringement.'" Modern courts have
denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984) (ideas on how to play Scrabble not protected by copyright). See infra notes 121-30
and accompanying text.
12. An excellent example of this reasoning is Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No.
2,872), in which the plaintiff sued the defendants for copying daily market quotations published by the plaintiff.
In denying copyright to the plaintiff's publication on grounds of insufficient originality, the court wrote as follows:
[Gireat praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in publishing this paper, yet
the law does not contemplate their being rewarded [via copyright]; it must seek patronage and protection
from its utility to the public and not as a work of science. The title of the act of [C]ongress is for the
encouragement of learning, and was not intended for the encouragement of mere industry, unconnected
with learning and the sciences.
Id. at 1003. As this Article will later discuss, modern courts are generally reluctant to engage in an assessment of
a work's value. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
13. The logic of this proposition is as follows: If more copyright protection is granted to works, then authors
will have greater economic rights, and therefore greater incentives to produce creative works. Thus, increasing the
proportion of expressions found in works increases the incentive to authors. Of course, if too much copyright
protection is granted, authors may find it difficult to create new works. See Landes & Posner supra note 3, at 332.
14. The case of Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987), clearly states this view:
[P]recisely because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we must pay particular attention to the
pragmatic considerations that underlie the distinction and copyright law generally. In this regard, we must
remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive balance
between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to promote learning, culture and
development.
Id. at 1235. See also Mcneil, supra note 3, at 1065 (1989).
15. 1 use the word "unfortunately" because the conceptual tidiness of the economic model is so seductive. If
we truly could base copyright on economics alone, many of the hard philosophical issues in property law could be
avoided in favor of a quest for efficiency. As a matter of theory, a sophisticated set of mathematical equations
could express the optimal copyright regime. See Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 333-43. Against this backdrop,
the realization that economies cannot solve our problems seems unfortunate, for we are forced to confront again
the difficult and uncertain issues inherent in shaping a scheme of property rights.
16. See infra note 119.
17. See Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a
Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 E, oRY LJ. 393, 407-20 (1989).
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used copyright to protect an artist's perspective,' the general appearance of
works, 19 the basic structure of a computer program,20 and the page numbers of
legal case reporters.2 1
Under the economic copyright model, the propriety of copyright's expan-
sion rests solely on an economic cost-benefit calculation. Courts should allow
copyright to expand as long as the benefits of increased creative activity out-
weigh its costs. If we are serious about the exclusion of other property theories
from copyright jurisprudence, no other considerations are relevant. Even though
the concepts of fairness, equity and justice might suggest directions in which to
proceed, we must ignore them in favor of economic analysis.
A critical look at modern copyright reveals the error in such a course of
action. First, copyright protects works whose creation does not depend on the
economic incentive of copyright.2' In fact, courts frequently decide controversial
copyright cases with no explicit consideration of the economic consequences.
This implies that something besides economics influences copyright decisions. 23
Second, analysts disagree sharply over the economic implications of copyright. 4
This raises doubts about whether economics is in fact capable of yielding relia-
ble policy recommendations.2 5
18. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("one can hardly
gainsay the right of an artist to protect his choice of perspective and layout in a drawing, especially in conjunction
with the overall concept and individual details.").
19. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (protecting
the "total concept and feel" of television show); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1970) (protecting the "total concept and feel" of greeting cards); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (protecting the "total concept and feel" of visual displays created by
computer program).
20. Whelan Assocs., v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1031 (1987) (extending protection to the sequence, structure and organization of a computer program). For an
attack on the expansion of copyright implied by Whelan, see Davis, Computer Software-The Final Frontier:
Clones, Compatibility and Copyright, THE COMPUTER LAW., June 1985, at 3 ("[Whelan] is dangerously wrong,
and flies in the face of every copyright case involving the 'idea/expression dichotomy' since 1880.").
21. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1070 (1987). Cf Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1061 (1986) (prohibiting defendant from copying information found in plaintiff's map).
22. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
23. Despite the professed allegiance to economic copyright analysis, recent scholarship suggests the aca-
demic adoption of noneconomic copyright thinking. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 1351 (arguing that "'wealth
maximization' as an aggregative criterion that disregards the possibility of independently derived individual rights,
cannot serve as an acceptable foundation for the initial assignment of entitlements."). See also Brown, Eligibility
for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 607 (1985) (advocating the
combination of economic and authors' rights approaches); Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright
Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 590 (1987) (analyzing the work made for hire doctrine by merging author-based
and economic approaches); Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. LJ. 287 (1988) (basing
intellectual property on philosophies of Locke and Hegel); Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of
Society's Primacy in Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 COL J.L. & ARTS 381 (1986) (contending that natural
law should be the dominant theory in copyright).
24. Compare Breyer, supra note 3 (questioning the economic justification for copyright) with Abramson,
How Much Copying Under Copyright? Contradictions, Paradoxes, Inconsistencies, 61 TEMPLE L. REV. 133, 142-
45 (1988) (advocating the economic desirability of greater copyright protection for research); and Tyerman, The
Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L.
REv. 1100 (1971). See also Litman, The Public Domain, 34 EMORY L.J. - (fall 1990) (referring to the
"unruly brawl" among economists).
25. See Brown, supra note 23, at 596 (1985) ("The hard part, even for an economist, is to decide just how
much legitimation of exclusive rights in intellectual property is needed to induce the optimal flow of writings and
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These problems motivate this Article's inquiry. If noneconomic principles
affect copyright's shape, then ignoring those principles puts copyright theory out
of touch with judicial practice. Moreover, if genuine doubts about the reliability
of economics exists, then rejecting the insights of other analytical methods, par-
ticularly those which already affect copyright, would seem ill-advised. Indeed,
noneconomic theories might prove helpful in surmounting the deficiencies of ec-
onomic analysis. Consequently, this Article explores the problems associated
with viewing copyright solely as a tool for achieving economic efficiency, as well
as how natural law can help deal with these shortcomings.
First, the Article demonstrates that economics has not been solely responsi-
ble for copyright's development and basic structure. Part I briefly reviews copy-
right's history and doctrine to reveal the unmistakable presence of natural law
alongside economic theory. The Article will show that copyright has somehow
developed along lines suggested by neutral law despite the economic focus of
modern copyright jurisprudence. Thus, the economic copyright model provides
an unnecessarily cramped perspective by ignoring a rich jurisprudential tradi-
tion which is already imbedded in copyright. This alone suggests the restoration
of natural law to our copyright jurisprudence, if only to accurately reflect the
course of copyright's development.
Second, the Article considers the consequences of extinguishing copyright's
natural law facets in favor of the blind pursuit of efficiency. Part II demon-
strates that even if a doggedly economic perspective on copyright is deemed
desirable,16 there is little hope that such a course of action will yield recommen-
dations on which we may confidently rely. Even if we make the simplifying
assumption that wealth acts as a surrogate for welfare, sound recommendations
will elude us. First, society cannot collect the information necessary to deter-
mine whether a given scheme of copyright will maximize wealth. Second, even
if the information were available, economic theory itself suggests that the use of
wealth maximization to assign property rights leads to indeterminate or multi-
ple policy recommendations. The wealth maximizing society risks endlessly
switching back and forth between inconsistent wealth maximizing positions or
else weakly justifying whatever set of rights is proposed. These problems sug-
gest that natural law could prove helpful in constructing a sensible copyright
regime.
Third, the Article explores the implications of explicitly restoring natural
law thinking to copyright jurisprudence. In particular, Part III describes how
natural law can help maintain a balanced perspective on copyright by justifying
both authors' rights and a strong public domain. In so doing, the Article ad-
dresses the common concern that natural law leads to the unprincipled expan-
of inventions. Not much has been written on this critical issue and what there is gives little immediate guid-
ance."). Certainly it is plausible that the divergent recommendations might be resolved with advances in the state
of economic research. However, practical and theoretical obstacles make this a doubtful proposition. See infra
notes 143-77 and accompanying text.
26. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to redebate this point, it seems obvious that we should
hesitate to ever define rights through economic efficiency alone. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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sion of authors' rights. The Article concludes with a brief observation about the
use of natural law and economics in future copyright thinking.
I. A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF NATURAL LAW IN COPYRIGHT
A. A Natural Law Theory of Copyright
The study of natural law's influence in copyright requires identifying the
relevant concepts at their source, Roman natural law." Although natural law
later developed claims of moral supremacy,28 the Romans had far humbler aspi-
rations for their natural law. Romans did not consider natural law morally su-
perior to other forms of law. Indeed, they recognized that law sometimes justifi-
ably supported institutions directly contrary to natural law.29 Instead, Romans
viewed natural law as justified simply because the principles of natural law re-
flected the reality of nature. Such principles were therefore sensible ways to
govern the affairs of persons. 30
Although the Romans recognized numerous methods of acquiring owner-
ship in things,3' the primary form of acquisition was the natural law principle of
occupancy, or occupatio. The concept was simple. "Natural reason admits the
title of the first occupant to that which previously had no owner."32 Thus, ob-
jects belonged to those who first took possession of them.'3
Not surprisingly, Roman natural law also contained limits on the extent of
ownership one could claim through occupancy. These limits were the logical
corollaries of occupancy. If a person owned what she possessed, she could not
own those objects which were by nature impossible to possess. Natural law
could not recognize individual ownership of these things because an attempt to
do so would be futile. For example, the doctrine of res communes held that "the
following things are by natural law common to all-the air, running water, the
sea, and consequently the sea-shore."' 4 Similarly, under the doctrine of ferae
naturae, wild animals were inherently free, and were considered property only
so long as the owner maintained actual physical possession. If a wild animal
27. The Romans divided law into three parts: jus naturale, jus gentium, and jus civile. Jus naturale, or
natural law, was considered common to all men because it reflected the true nature of things. Jus gentium, or the
law of nations, consisted of principles shared by all civilized societies. Barbarians apparently did not share these
values. Jus civile, or civil law, reflected principles which were strictly Roman in nature. See J. INST. 1.2.1-2 (J.B.
Moyle trans. 3rd ed. 1896); Dig. 1.1.1.2 (A. Watson trans. 1985); L. WEINREB, supra note 1, at 44-46; A.P.
D'ENTREVES, supra note I, at 24-30 (1952).
28. A.P. D'ENTREVES, supra note 1, at 59-61 (1952). See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
29. Id. at 30.
30. Id. at 29-30, 49. Roman natural law was part of the Roman attempt to understand the simple reality of
the world in which the Romans lived. Unlike eighteenth century English natural law, there was nothing aspira-
tional about Roman natural law. Roman natural law was simply the set of legal rules which corresponded to the
simple facts of life. As such, it was a quasi-scientific, inherently rational way of constructing the law. If water
flowed downhill, then Roman natural law would reflect that reality.
31. INSTITUTES 2.1.1-2.1.18; DIGESTS 41.1.1.
32. INSTITUTES 2.1.12; DIGESTS 41.1.3.
33. INSTITUTES 2.1.18; DIGESTS 1.8.3.
34. INSTITUTES 2.1.1; DIGESTS 1.8.2, 1.8.4.
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escaped, it regained its inherent liberty. Therefore, it no longer belonged to its
original owner and could become the property of its next captor.35
Roman natural law had a powerful influence on the law of eighteenth cen-
tury England.3 " The general concept of natural law entered England through
the work of medieval and enlightenment scholars. However, the English
changed natural law's fundamental character. As noted earlier, Roman natural
law was the construction of rules which simply reflected the way things were.
By contrast, English natural law became the construction of rules which pre-
scribed the way things were. This development transformed the natural law of
property from the simple reflection of nature's status quo to the legal vindica-
tion of a person's natural rights.3
This outlook on the natural law of property can be seen in the philosophy
of its most famous proponent, John Locke. Locke began with the assumption
that people had a natural right of property in their bodies. Since people owned
their bodies, Locke reasoned that they also owned the labor of their bodies and,
by extension, the fruits of that labor.38 Thus, a person who mixed her labor with
an unowned object became morally entitled to property in that object.39
The English transformation of natural law carried the potential for a mas-
sive change in the natural law of property. If, as Locke intimated, labor were all
that was necessary to give a person a natural right of property in an unowned
object, then perhaps an individual's labor would be sufficient to make the ocean
her private property. However, this result never reached doctrinal fruition. In-
stead, Roman doctrines of possession survived more or less intact as part of
English natural law, thereby limiting the vindication of an individual's labor to*
objects which were thought of as inherently capable of possession. Thus, al-
though Blackstone noted Locke's theoretical justification of property through
labor, he explicitly grounded the vesting of personal property upon the natural
law of occupancy. 41 Similarly, Blackstone adopted Roman natural law logic by
limiting the reach of occupancy through the doctrines of res communes and
ferae naturae.42
The effect of all this was that the English natural law of property devel-
oped as the combination of two legal traditions: the Roman doctrines of posses-
sion and the moral philosophy of Locke. In other words, the English did see
property law as the vindication of a person's moral right to property in the
35. INSTITUTES 2.1.12-15; DIGESTS 41.1.5.
36. For our purposes, the eighteenth century English view of natural law is particularly important, for it
provided the philosophical and moral underpinnings of property that were prevalent during copyright's formative
years.
37. A. P. D'ENTREVES, supra note I, at 49, 59-61. In other words, the Romans constructed natural law by
determining the way the world was. By contrast, the English constructed natural law by determining the way they
wanted the world to be. Id.
38. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 27, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(1698) (P. Laslett ed, 1970).
39. Id. See also L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 32-57 (1977).
40. Cf. R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE. AND UTOPIA 175 (1974).
41. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *8, 400.
42. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *14, 395. These English conceptions of Roman law eventually
traveled to America. See 2 J. KENT, supra note 2, at 289-93.
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fruits of her labor. However, the English vindicated that right only if the fruits
of that labor were considered capable of permanent possession. If those fruits of
labor were similar to the sea, air, and light and therefore incapable of perma-
nent possession, the laborer received no property and could claim only a tempo-
rary right of use.43
This view of property readily suggests the general contours of a copyright
regime based upon the natural law. The justification of property as the conse-
quence of a person's labor implies that an author's labor of creation supports
copyright. As a general matter, a person rightfully claims ownership in her
works to the extent that her labor resulted in their existence. The property ex-
ists regardless of any need for the economic stimulation of creative activity.
However, it must be remembered that not all labor results in property. To the
extent that the author creates things which are not capable of possession under
the law, natural law doctrines prohibit the creation of a property interest."'
The ease with which one constructs a natural law theory of copyright sug-
gests that such a perspective might offer useful insights, especially in areas
where economic recommendations are uncertain. This realization alone suggests
expanding our broadening copyright jurisprudence to include more than eco-
nomics. However, the case supporting such a course of action runs deeper than
this, for copyright's link to the natural law is historical as well as theoretical. As
the next section demonstrates, both natural law and economic policy motivated
copyright's development. Thus, expanding our perspective would put copyright
theory in touch with copyright's actual roots.
B. Two Roots of Copyright Theory
Oddly enough, the story of copyright begins with a strange partnership of
censorship and commercial interest. The development of the printing press ena-
bled the rapid spread of written political and religious challenges to the author-
ity of the British Monarch. The printing press also created a new industry, the
printing and selling of books.
43. Blackstone wrote as follows:
[T]here are some few things, which, notwithstanding the general introduction and continuance of prop-
erty, must still unavoidably remain in common; being such wherein nothing but an usufructuary property
is capable of being had: and therefore they still belong to the first occupant, during the time he holds
possession Of them, and no longer. Such (among others) are the elements of light, air and water...
2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *14. Thus, a person might labor to breathe air into her lungs. That labor
would result in a valid claim to temporary use of the air. Once exhaled, though, the air again became the common
property of all.
44. Although this section has developed possession as an actual physical limitation on the extent of a per-
son's property, its application in copyright crosses into the metaphysical. The key notion is that inherent limits on
the reach of human property exist. These limits ought to be respected because failure to do so results in chaos. See
supra notes 1, 30, 34-35 and accompanying text. The Romans limited property in certain tangible things because
those things were inherently difficult for humans to hold. Of course, in copyright we are not concerned with the
actual physical possession of works. Physical possession of a book can be held separately from copyright in a book.
See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988). However, certain facets of every work are denied property status because their
inherent nature makes them difficult to "hold" as property through copyright. As we shall see, one may exclude
ideas from copyright's reach because their vague nature renders them elusive targets for copyright law. See infra
notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
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Naturally, the Crown became interested in using censorship to suppress
challenges to its authority. In 1557, Queen Mary enlisted the economic interests
of printers and booksellers in the pursuit of her political goals. By Letters Pat-
ent, the Queen granted exclusive rights of printing to the members of the Sta-
tioners' Company. Company officials gained the power to seize and destroy un-
authorized presses and books.45 In return for the profits gained from their
monopolistic control over the licensing and printing of books and pamphlets, the
Stationers' Company acted as the enforcers of the Crown's censorship. This re-
gime continued under various Star Chamber decrees until about 1640, when
Parliament abolished the Star Chamber. 41
After 1640, the Stationers' Company struggled to protect their property
and power over the licensing and printing of books. Although England wit-
nessed the Glorious Revolution and the reinstatement of the Crown during this
period, the Stationers managed to maintain their position as the government's
official printing press by petitioning for the so-called licensing acts.4 In 1694,
the House of Commons refused to renew the Licensing Act of 1662, and censor-
ship lapsed.48
Although emancipation of the English press was a marvelous development,
the Stationers' Company regarded it as tragic, for the end of censorship also
marked the end of their virtually unfettered monopoly in the book trade. The
most powerful group of Stationers, the booksellers,49 supported renewal of the
Licensing Act because "if their Property should not be provided for, . . . [the
booksellers' livelihood] will be utterly ruined. '50 The House of Commons re-
jected the booksellers' plea, in part because the booksellers "are impowered to
hinder the printing [of] all innocent and useful Books; and have an Opportunity
to enter a title to themselves, and their Friends, for what belongs to, and is the
Labour and Right of, others." 51 Attempts by the booksellers to gain new protec-
tive legislation failed in 1703 and in 1706.52
Having failed in three attempts to regain their monopoly through censor-
ship, the booksellers changed tactics and appealed to the public interest. They
argued that failure to continue exclusive rights of printing had resulted in disin-
45. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3-9 (1967); L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HIs-
TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 27 (1968).
46. L. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 114-25. The exact year is disputed. Messrs. Skone James, Mummery,
and Rayner James state the year as 1640. Dean Patterson documents the year to be 1641. Compare E.P. SKONE
JAMES. J. MUMMERY, J.E. RAYNER JAMES. COPINGER & SKONE JAMES. COPYRIGHT 8 (12th ed. 1980) with L.
PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 125.
47. L. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 126-34.
48. Id. at 139; 11 H.C. JOUR. 228.
49. See Patterson, Private Copyright and Public Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 1161, 1172 (1975).
50. Patterson, supra note 49, at 1172; 11 H.C. JOUR. 288.
51. L. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 139; 11 H.C. JOUR. 306. The quoted passage is one of a long list of
reasons for denying the booksellers' request. Interestingly, other reasons included the poor quality and high cost of
the booksellers' editions.
52. L. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 141-42; 14 H.C. JOUR. 306; 15 H.C. JOUR. 313. The House of Com-
mons postponed consideration of the booksellers' desired legislation no less than fourteen consecutive times be-
tween January 13 and March 14, 1703. 14 H.C. JOUR. 278, 306, 312, 319, 327, 338-39, 347, 357, 366, 369, 372,
375, 376, 377. The booksellers' efforts met a similar, but quicker, fate in 1706. 15 H.C. JOUR. 321, 322, 346.
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centives to writers. Without some sort of protection to encourage authors, the
public interest would be harmed by the decreased flow of works.53
This tactic succeeded. The resulting statute, the Statute of Anne,54 secured
for authors the exclusive right to print their works. Among other things, the
Statute granted authors copyright terms of up to twenty-eight years for newly
published works. 5  The Statute protected the interests of the booksellers by ex-
tending the exclusive rights to the assigns of authors as well.56 The booksellers
knew that their position in the market was such that authors would, as a practi-
cal matter, be forced to sell their manuscripts to the Stationers' Company if
they wanted to get their work published at all.57
For purposes of this Article, the Statute of Anne is of particular interest
because it establishes copyright's development as economically inspired statu-
tory law. Parliament enacted the Statute as a response to the booksellers' unde-
sirable monopoly in the book selling business. Thus, the Statute purposefully
limited the duration of the monopoly which could be claimed while providing
some commercial stability for authors and publishers.58 Furthermore, Parlia-
ment explicitly adopted the public interest as a touchstone for the Statute, enti-
tling it "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning. '59 Final evidence of the
Statute's economic focus follows from the fact that the Statute contained provi-
sions for controlling the price paid for books.6°
The economic policy espoused by the Statute of Anne temporarily mollified
the self interest of the booksellers. However, the expiration of the statutory
terms of protection again caused the booksellers' monopoly over certain works
to lapse, giving competing publishers free access to previously copyrighted
materials. The booksellers again turned to Parliament, but this time they failed
to obtain relief.6'
Unable to shake the legislature's views, the booksellers then tried the Eng-
lish courts. However, instead of appealing to the public's interest in providing
incentives for the creation of works, the booksellers claimed that authors (and
they themselves as the authors' assignees) owned perpetual common law copy-
rights in books.6"
Drawing inspiration from noted scholars such as John Locke, the booksell-
ers took advantage of the prevailing view that property arose from the labor of
53. L. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 142.
54. 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710), reprinted in H. RANSOM. THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 109-17 (1956).
55. The twenty-eight years consisted of an initial term of fourteen years, with a second term available if the
author was still living at the end of the first term. Id. at 117. Existing works were given an additional twenty-one
year term. Id. at 110. This constituted a direct windfall to already existing publishers.
56. Id.
57. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law
Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1139 n.54 (1983).
58. L. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 146-47. The statute explicitly recognized the harm caused by pirates
while rebuffing the Stationers' attempts for longer terms of copyright.
59. H. RANSOM, supra note 54, at 109.
60. Id. at 112-15.
61. The rebuke was stinging. A letter to an M.P. attacked the Stationers' request as "in Effect .. . estab-
lishing a perpetual Monopoly, a Thing deservedly odious in the Eye of the Law- . L. PATTERSON, supra note
45, at 155.
62. Id. at 158.
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the individual. They contended that books were peculiarly the product of human
labor.63 Since these books were therefore the author's property, any unautho-
rized use constituted an invasion of the author's property rights." Under this
line of reasoning, even if the Statute of Anne no longer protected a work from
unauthorized reprinting, the common law did.
This argument reached its greatest prominence in the landmark case of
Millar v. Taylor.6 5 Millar was the publisher of James Thomson's poem "The
Seasons." ' 6 As publisher, Millar had purchased Thomson's ownership in the
poem and had enjoyed the protection of the Statute of Anne for a full term.6 7
Once that term expired, the defendant Taylor began publishing the poem him-
self.6 8 A lawsuit soon followed.
Millar focused his argument around the natural rights which flowed from
the author's labor.6 9 Millar contended that the resulting common law vindica-
tion of these rights could not be abridged by the Statute of Anne."0 Taylor
argued to the contrary. He asserted that common law copyright was a fiction.
Since copyright was an incorporeal right, it was not capable of possession and
therefore could not be recognized under principles of natural law.7" Further-
more, he claimed that Millar's selling copies of the book constituted a dedica-
tion to the public. Therefore, any exclusive rights owned by Millar existed only
to the extent provided by the Statute of Anne.7'
The court decided three to one in favor of Millar. The majority focused on
the justice inherent in vindicating the author's labor of creation:
[B]ecause it is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own inge-
nuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name, without his consent.
It is fit, that he should judge when to publish, or whether he ever will publish. It is fit,
he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication; how many; what
volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will trust the accuracy
and correctness of the impression; to whose honesty he will confide, not to foist in
additions: with the other reasonings of the same effect. 73
In the view of two members of the majority,74 the justice inherent in this
reasoning made it imperative for the court to recognize the plaintiff's ownership
of copyright under the law of occupancy. Even though the justices recognized
the incorporeal nature of copyright, they believed that the problems of posses-
63. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
66. Id. at 205.
67. Id. at 203-04.
68. Id. at 204-05. Thomson first published "The Seasons" in 1727. Therefore, Taylor's republication on
May 20, 1763, took place after the expiration of any protection afforded by the Statute of Anne.
69. Id. at 221, 229.
70. Id. at 202.
71. Id. at 219.
72. Id. at 202.
73. Id. at 252 (opinion of Mansfield, J.). See also id. at 220 (opinion of Aston, J.); id., at 218 (opinion of
Willes, J.) ("it is certainly not agreeable to natural justice, that a stranger should reap the beneficial pecuniary
produce of another man's work.").
74. Each justice delivered his own opinion.
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sion could be overcome. 5 In the view of the third, the plaintiff's claim had to be
vindicated even though the law of occupancy did not do so. 7 6
For our purposes, the decision of Millar v. Taylor is important because it
established a natural law theory of copyright alongside the economic approach
taken by the Statute of Anne. Copyright now existed not only by reason of
economic necessity, but also by reason of the natural justice inherent in vindi-
cating the author's labor through the natural law of possession. However, this
state of affairs was short-lived. A scant five years later, the House of Lords
overruled Millar in the case of Donaldson v. Beckett."
Donaldson's reversal of Millar can be read as the elimination of natural
law from copyright theory. After all, Millar expressly recognized the natural
right of authors to property in their works. Donaldson's reversal therefore cor-
rected the Millar court's error and left copyright standing solely as a matter of
economically inspired statutory law. Indeed, Donaldson has been construed as
conclusive proof that natural law has no place in copyright jurisprudence.78
Although such a broad reading of Donaldson is plausible, later events show
that Donaldson did not conclusively eliminate natural law from Anglo-Ameri-
can copyright thinking. Even if the House of Lords specifically intended to de-
stroy natural law as a basis for copyright, the Donaldson decision did not con-
vince England's rebellious offspring, the Americans. Instead of reading
Donaldson as the end of natural law in copyright, early American thinkers jus-
tified copyright under both natural law and economic principles.
The strongest evidence of this combination can be seen in the preambles of
state copyright statutes which were enacted between 1783 and 1786. Many of
these preambles explicitly referred to both economic and natural law theories of
copyright. For example, the New Hampshire's statute stated as follows:
As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, and the advancement of
human happiness, greatly depend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons in the
various arts and sciences; as the principal encouragement such persons can have to
make great and beneficial exertions of this nature, must consist in the legal security of
the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and as such security is one of the
75. Id. at 221-22 (opinion of Aston, J.):
[Copyright] is a personal, incorporeal property, saleable and profitable; it has indicia certa: for, though the
sentiments and doctrine may be called ideal, yet when the same are communicated to the sight and under-
standing of every man, by the medium of printing, the work becomes a distinguishable subject of property,
and not totally destitute of corporeal qualities.
Lord Mansfield concurred fully in Justice Aston's views. Id. at 251.
76. Id. at 218 (Opinion of Willes, J.):
Metaphysical reasoning is too subtile; and arguments from [sic] the supposed modes of acquiring the
property of acorns, or a vacant piece of ground in an imaginary state of nature, are too remote. Besides,
the comparison does not hold between things which have a physical existence, and incorporeal rights.
77. 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774). Interestingly, Donaldson also involved James Thomson's "The Seasons." After
the Millar v. Taylor decision, the common law copyright to "The Seasons" was acquired by a syndicate of print-
ers. Donaldson arose when Beckett, a member of the syndicate, obtained an injunction against Alexander and
John Donaldson, the proprietors of an unauthorized edition. Donaldson appealed to the House of Lords, who
overturned Millar. Abrams, supra note 57, at 1156.
78. See Abrams, supra note 57.
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natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly a man's own than
that which is produced by the labor of his mind . . .1
Further evidence is provided by Madison's apparent approval of Millar in
his writings about the Constitution's copyright clause:"0
The utility of [the copyright power] will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.
The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The
public good fully coincides in both cases, with the claims of individuals.81
Thus, early American copyright theorists did not share the modern view
that copyright is motivated solely by economic considerations. Instead, early
Americans saw copyright as a matter of both economic policy and natural law.
This means that modern copyright theory has lost touch with one of copyright's
roots in early American legal thought. Indeed, American use of natural law
after Donaldson's reversal of Millar illustrates natural law's powerful appeal in
copyright. It also suggests that the adoption of a natural law perspective on
copyright is necessary to accurately reflect and analyze the logic which has his-
torically influenced copyright. The strength of this proposition increases with
further consideration of copyright's development.
C. The Influence of Natural Law in Modern American Copyright
The study of natural law's influence in modern copyright starts with the
seminal case of Wheaton v. Peters. 2 Like Millar, Wheaton involved a common
79. Act of Encouragement of Literature, 1783 N.H. LAws 305. The copyright statutes of Massachusetts
and Rhode Island contained essentially identical preambles. An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the
exclusive Right and Benefit of publishing their Literary Productions for Twenty-one Years, ch. 26, 1783 MASS.
LAws 236; An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the exclusive Right and Benefit of publishing their
literary Productions, for Twenty-one Years, 1783 R.I. PUB. LAws 6. Furthermore, the Connecticut statute
provided:
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the Principles of natural Equity and Justice, that every Author should
be secured in receiving the profits that may arise from the Sale of his Works, and such Security may
encourage Men of Learning and Genius to publish their Writings; which may do Honor to their Country,
and Service to Mankind.
An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius, 1783 CONN. PUB. AcTs. 617. The New York statute is
substantially identical. An Act to Promote Literature, ch. 54, 1783 N.Y. LAws 298. The New Jersey statute
contained the following preamble:
Whereas Learning tends to the Embellishment of Human Nature, the Honour of the Nation, and the
general Good of Mankind; and as it is perfectly agreeable to the Principles of Equity, that Men of Learn-
ing who devote their Time and Talents to the preparing of Treatises for Publication should have the
Profits that may arise from the Sale of their Works secured to them . ..
An Act for the Promotion and Encouragement of Literature, ch. 21, 1783 N.J. LAWS 47. Finally, the North
Carolina statute provided:
Whereas nothing is more strictly a man's own than the fruit of his study, and it is proper that men should
be encouraged to pursue useful knowledge by the hope of reward; and as the security of literary property
must greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote the useful discoveries and to the general extension of
arts and commerce ...
An Act for Securing Literary Property, ch. 26, 1785 N.C. LAWS 403. For a more complete analysis of evidence
that early Americans viewed copyright as a matter of natural law, see Kauffman, supra note 23, at 403-08.
80. Although the copyright clause supports economic interpretations of copyright, it does not eliminate nat-
ural law from copyright thinking. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (J. Madison) (E.M. Earle ed. 1976) (emphasis added).
82. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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law claim to a work which had no statutory copyright protection. In Wheaton,
the United States Supreme Cour.t confronted a dispute between its official re-
porter, Richard Peters, and his predecessor, Henry Wheaton. The dispute cen-
tered around Peters' publishing a series of "Condensed Reports" which con-
tained a number of decisions previously reported by Wheaton. Wheaton claimed
that Peters' condensed reports violated Wheaton's statutory and common law
copyright.83 Like Millar, Wheaton based his common law copyright claim on
the appeal of an author's inherent right to property in the fruits of his labor.84
The Court held, seven to two, in favor of Peters. The Court began its opin-
ion by analyzing Wheaton's common law claim. The Court first distinguished
common law copyright from an author's natural right to property in his manu-
script. The former involved a perpetual right to control future publication of a
work, while the latter consisted of a mere right to control his work until its first
publication.8 5 According to the Court, the common law could only recognize
Wheaton's right of first publication because the broader claim might lead to an
overly expansive author's monopoly.86
The Court also noted that even if it was plausible that American common
law granted Wheaton's broader claim, English common law did not.87 Further-
more, even if the English did recognize common law copyright, the relevant
American jurisdictions did not.88 Therefore, common law copyright did not exist
in the United States, and Wheaton could claim relief only under the federal
copyright statute.89 The Court then denied Wheaton's claim under the federal
statute on the ground that Wheaton had failed to comply with the statutory
requirement of deposit for copyright protection."0
Like Donaldson, Wheaton can be read as requiring the elimination of copy-
right's natural law dimensions in favor of increasing emphasis on copyright's
economic theory. First, Wheaton explicitly disavowed the existence of common
law copyright, which was based in the natural law. Second, Wheaton's rejection
of common law copyright meant that the federal copyright statute became the
only source of copyright protection for a published work. Since the federal stat-
ute arose under constitutional authority to promote the useful arts, it seemed
natural for courts to adopt this purpose as copyright's guiding principle."
83. Id. at 594-96.
84. Id. at 652.
85. Id. at 657.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 658-60. The Court's reasoning on this point is somewhat convoluted. With respect to federal law,
the Court held that there was no such thing as federal common law. Thus, the existence of common law copyright
was a matter of Pennsylvania state law. In answering this question, the Court noted that Pennsylvania had been
colonized long before Millar recognized common law copyright in England. This in turn meant that Pennsylvania
could not possibly have adopted common law copyright. For critiques of this reasoning, see Abrams, supra note
57, at 1183; 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02[C] (1989).
89. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 663 (1834).
90. Id. at 667-68.
91. US. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause states "Congress shall be empowered . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "
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A superficial look at modern cases would seem to indicate that copyright
has evolved under this reading of Wheaton. Many legislative and judicial state-
ments display a clear economic orientation towards copyright.92 However, the
actual development of copyright law has never completely lived up to this rheto-
ric. Although the Wheaton Court rejected the plaintiff's common law copyright
claim, the natural law concepts which inspired common law copyright and early
copyright statutes remained part and parcel of copyright jurisprudence. Even
though economics became the ostensibly sole basis of copyright, modern copy-
right somehow evolved along lines similar to those suggested by the natural law.
This can be seen most clearly by outlining the basic copyright doctrines of origi-
nality and the idea/expression dichotomy 3 and then comparing them to the
natural law of property through labor and possession. As we shall see, modern
American copyright appears to vindicate an author's right to property in the
fruits of her labor, but subject to the limits of what can be feasibly possessed.
1. Originality and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
As noted earlier, the concepts of originality and the idea/expression dichot-
omy define the basic outlines of modern American copyright law. The copyright
code grants protection to all "original works of authorship. '94 Conversely, the
idea/expression dichotomy limits the reach of copyright by specifically exclud-
ing ideas from an author's property.95
Understanding the concept of originality begins with the seminal case of
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.6 In Sarony, the plaintiff sued the
defendant for reproducing a photograph of Oscar Wilde.97 The defendant coun-
Those who advocate a strictly economic analysis of copyright generally use the language "to promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts" as support for their position. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 1696 n.184;
Menell, supra note 3, at 1058. Although this language certainly supports economic visions of copyright, it does not
eliminate natural law from copyright jurisprudence. In particular, the clause implies that Congress is not empow-
ered to create a new right, but is instead empowered to secure for authors a preexisisting right. This view is
supported by the fact that James Madison and Charles Pinckney each supported the clause by referring separately
to encouraging knowledge and securing authors' rights. See L. PATTERSON, supra note 45, at 192-94, 195 ("The
Constitution's copyright clause is so general that it is impossible to infer any one theory of copyright alone from
the language."); Kauffman, supra note 23, at 407-08. See also supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 4. See also H.R. REP. no. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909):
The enactment of copyright legislation . . . is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his
writings, . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science
and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their
writings.
93. Readers who are already familiar with these basic concepts may wish to skip to subsection two below.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Interestingly, early copyright statutes specifically listed the types of works
which could claim protection under the federal copyright statute. The first copyright act of 1790 limited protection
to maps, books and charts (Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, I Stat. 124). The act was gradually amended throughout
the nineteenth century to include musical compositions in 1831 (Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 463), dra-
matic compositions in 1856 (Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138), and photographs and negatives in 1865
(Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540). By 1870 works of fine arts such as paintings and drawings supple-
mented the listing (Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 212). In 1909, however, Congress enlarged the scope of
protection to broadly include "all the writings of an author," in section 4 of the revised enactment (Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 320, § 4. 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988)).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
96. III U.S. 53 (1884).
97. Id. at 53.
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tered by claiming that photographs were nothing more than "reproduction [s] on
paper of the exact features of some natural object or person .. *"98 Therefore,
the defendant argued, photographs were not "writings" of "authors" and could
never gain protection under any federal copyright statute.99
The defendant's argument failed. In ruling for the plaintiff, the Court re-
jected the notion that the term "writings" could be narrowly construed so as to
exclude photographs from the purview of federal copyright. In doing so, the
Court noted that the first copyright statute included maps and charts in its
protectable subject matter.'00 Since that statute was enacted in 1790, soon after
ratification of the Constitution, the Court reasoned that the Congress of 1790
must have contained many framers whose obviously broad interpretation of
"writings" was entitled to great deference.' 0 ' Thus, the Court felt compelled to
include items other than books, essays and poems in the term "writings."'02
Having justified its broad construction of "writings," the Court went on to
define the constitutional scope of copyright. First, the Court defined "author" as
"he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a
work of science or literature."' 03 The Court also defined "writings" as "the lit-
erary productions of those authors.' 0 4 On the basis of these definitions, the
Court held that the Congress had properly included "all forms of writing, print-
ing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are
given visible expression."' 105
The Court then considered the defendant's contention that photographs
could not owe their origin to an author because photographs amounted to no
more than the physical reproduction of objects already existing in nature. The
Court stated that the defendant might be correct with respect to "the ordinary
production of a photograph."'0 6 However, the Court noted that in this case the
photographer composed the photograph entirely from his own mental process of
selection and conception. 0 7 This meant that the photograph was copyrightable
as a product of the plaintiff's intellect. 08
From the standpoint of copyright jurisprudence, Sarony is important be-
cause it decided the question of copyrightability by asking whether the work in
98. Id. at 56.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 56-57.
101. Id. at 57.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 58.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 59.
107. According to the Court, the plaintiff's photograph arose:
[E]ntirely from his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar
Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accesso-
ries in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing
the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, arrange-
ment, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.
Id. at 60.
108. The Court described the photograph as "an original work of art, the product of the plaintiff's intellec-
tual invention, of which the plaintiff is the author. ... Id.
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question was "original," Le., the result of the plaintiff's own mental conception.
This approach was significant because it began the course whereby a work's
copyrightability would rest not upon inclusion in a list such as "maps, charts
and books" but instead upon production by an author, regardless of form.
Of course, the Court's use of the term "original" did not settle its meaning.
At first, courts construed "original" to mean that the work had to display some
sort of artistic merit. 09 However, this approach disappeared after the turn of
the century, when the Supreme Court effectively removed any requirement that
works demonstrate value as a prerequisite to copyright. In Bleistein v. Donald-
son Lithographing Co.,'10 the plaintiff sued the defendant for copying three pos-
ters prepared by the plaintiff's employees to advertise his circus."' The defend-
ant claimed that the plaintiff's posters could not be the proper subject of
copyright because they were simply advertisements and lacked the necessary
artistic value."' The Court rejected the defendant's argument. First, the Court
stressed that copyrightability ultimately rests upon the intellectual labor of the
author.'13 Second, and more importantly, the Court refused to assess the artistic
value of the plaintiff's work. The Court wrote as follows:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation. . . .At the other end, copyright could be denied to pictures which
appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of
any public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say that they have not
an aesthetic and educational value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated
with contempt. . . .That these pictures had their worth and their success is suffi-
ciently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs'
rights.1'
The implication of this statement is clear. If a work results from the intel-
lectual labor of the author, it will gain copyright protection as long as the au-
thor has achieved something beyond "the narrowest and most obvious limits."" 5
A work can surmount these limits merely by the fact that others seek to
109. See Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891) ("To be entitled to a copyright the article must have
by itself some value as a composition, at least to the extent of serving some purpose other than as a mere adver-
tisement or designation of the subject to which it is attached."); J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 318
(7th Cir. 1897) (holding that a work "must have, by and of itself, some value as a composition" to be
copyrightable).
This requirement of merit apparently arose from the Sarony Court's concession that ordinary photographs
might not be copyrightable. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. By making this suggestion, the Sarony
Court implied that photographs which did not display an unusual degree of art lacked sufficient originality to gain
copyright protection.
110. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
Ill. Id. at 248.
112. Id. at 252-53 (dissenting opinion).
113. Id. at 250. The Court noted that the posters were the artists' representations of scenes from the plain-
tiff's circus. Thus, there was "no reason to doubt that these prints in their ensemble and in all their details, in
their design and particular combinations of figures, lines and colors, are the original work of the plaintiffs' de-
signer." Id.
114. Id. at 251-52 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 251.
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reproduce the work. Future cases cemented the minimal nature of this
requirement.
In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,"' the plaintiff successfully
claimed protection for engraved reproductions of master paintings already in
the public domain. Since the plaintiff was not the author of the paintings them-
selves, the only conceivably copyrightable element of the plaintiff's reproduc-
tions lay in any changes made by the engraver. These variations were slight, for
the mezzotint process used to make the reproductions revolved around an at-
tempted literal duplication of the original masters' works.' 17 The defendant con-
tended that these facts rendered the engravings insufficiently original to support
a copyright claim.
Despite these facts, the Second Circuit held in the plaintiff's favor. The
court indicated that even though the plaintiff's engravers were copying the mas-
ters' originals, the unintended variations from the public domain works were
sufficiently "original" to support copyright. This philosophy was captured by the
court's statement that "[a] copyist's bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a
shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable varia-
tions. Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt
it as his and copyright it."" 8
The development of copyright's low standard of originality sets the back-
drop against which to consider the idea/expression dichotomy. At first blush,
the minimal nature of originality suggests that an author can claim property
rights in practically everything she creates. However, copyright has never given
authors complete control over all fruits of their mental labor."19 Even though
116. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
117. Id. at 104.
118. Id. at 105. An extreme example of the minimal nature of originality is the ease of West Publishing Co.
v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). That case
involved West's claim that defendant Mead had infringed West's copyright in its well known law reporters by
means of Mead's so-called "star pagination" system. Id. at 1221. That system provided customers of Mead's Lexis
computer research service with the exact West page number on which a given screen of case text appeared. Id. at
1222. West sought a preliminary injunction against Mead's introduction of the "star pagination" system on the
ground that Mead's use of West's page numbers constituted the appropriation of copyrightable subject matter. Id.
The District Court held in favor of West. Id. On appeal, Mead argued that West's ease amounted to a claim to
page numbers and should therefore be denied because the page numbers could not possibly be the result of origi-
nal authorship. Id. at 1223, 1227. The Eighth Circuit disagreed. First, the court found that West could properly
copyright the arrangement and sequence of the cases found in its reporters. Id. at 1226. Second, the court found
that Mead's borrowing of the page numbers should be enjoined because Mead's Lexis users would otherwise gain
"a large part of what West has spent so much labor and industry compiling..." Id. at 1227. For an extensive
discussion and perceptive criticism of the West Publishing decision, see Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing the
Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719
(1989).
119. Not surprisingly, the degree of borrowing prohibited by copyright has grown alongside the scope of
copyrightable subject matter. Early American copyright statutes adopted a very limited view of infringement. As
a general rule, infringement occurred only through the unauthorized printing, publishing or sale of a copyrighted
work. Not until 1909 did "copying" become an infringement of all types of copyrighted works. See Patterson,
supra note 49, at 1185-89. For a look at cases which illustrate the growth of protection given to copyrighted
works, compare Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (refusing to find infringement
despite verbatim copying of 388 out of 866 pages from plaintiff's copyrighted work) and Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F.
Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (refusing to find defendant's German translation an infringement of
Harriet Beecher Stowe's UNCLE ToM's CABIN), with Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No.
3,552) (finding infringement in the defendant's use of a scene in which villain ties his victim to railroad tracks
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most works qualify for some degree of copyright protection, certain facets of
each work may be freely copied by others. The primary device by which this
result has been reached is the idea/expression dichotomy.'20
Although references to the concept can be seen in earlier cases,' the most
influential case construing the idea/expression dichotomy is Nichols v. Univer-
sal Pictures Corp.,122 in which the Second Circuit considered whether the de-
fendant's play The Cohens and The Kellys infringed the plaintiff's play Abie's
Irish Rose. Both plays shared numerous similarities. The plots centered around
the marriage of Jewish and Irish children, the tensions between the families, the
birth of grandchildren, and the reconciliation of the families through good for-
tune. 1 23 However, there were differences as well. In one play, differences in
wealth caused the interfamilial tension. In the other, religious zealotry was the
cause. In one play, the grandchildren played little role in the reconciliation,
while in the other the grandchildren played a major role.1 24
The court used the idea/expression dichotomy to limit the scope of possible
infringement. In a now famous passage, Judge Learned Hand formulated the
so-called "levels of abstractions test":
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent
only to have the hero perform a last minute rescue). Daly is apparently the first case which recognizes an abstract
claim of copyright. Ebenstein, Introduction to S. ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT LAW at xxii (1956).
Presently, the copyright statute grants five exclusive rights to the copyright holder: the right to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords, the right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work,
the right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work, the right to perform the copyrighted work, and the right to
display the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Interference with any of these rights may be considered
copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988). Generally, proof of infringement via copying is generally
accomplished in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff may introduce direct evidence of copying by the defendant
from the plaintiff's copyrighted work. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). Second, the
plaintiff may prove her case circumstantially by showing that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's work, and
that the defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's work. Ferguson v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 584
F.2d I H, 113 (5th Cir. 1978); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir.
1977). This second route is often taken because plaintiffs rarely have eyewitness or other direct evidence of copy-
ing. The logic behind the "access plus substantial similarity" test is that the defendant is likely to have copied
from the plaintiff's work if the defendant saw the plaintiff's work and also produced a work which contains so
many similarities to the plaintiff's work that the similarities could only have resulted from copying. Once the
plaintiff has introduced evidence which establishes this likelihood of copying, the defendant assumes the burden of
explaining the similarities through some benign cause. See Hebert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218 (Ist Cir. 1984).
120. Other devices include the useful article doctrine, which denies copyright protection to utilitarian works
or utilitarian aspects of works, and the fair use doctrine, which protects certain types of borrowing that might
otherwise be considered infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 101, 107 (1988); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (home recording of television programs for purposes of time shifting held not
infringement under fair use doctrine); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979) (overall shape of street light not copyrightable under useful article
doctrine).
121. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1133 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858);
Stowe v. Thomas. 23 F. Cas. 201, 206 (C.C.E.C. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514).
122. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
123. Id. at 120-21.
124. Id. at 121-22.
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the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended."'
When this reasoning was applied to the case before the court, Hand found that
the similarities between the plays were only similarities of idea. The court
therefore found no infringement.'
For our purposes, the importance of Nichols lies not so much in its actual
result as in its approach to copyright. By holding that the plaintiff's copyright
did not extend to the plot outline described, the court divided the plaintiff's
work into two parts-the uncopyrightable "idea," and the copyrightable "ex-
pression" of that "idea." 127 Thus, an author's uncopyrightable ideas could al-
ways be borrowed, and future infringement cases could be decided by asking
whether or not the defendant had borrowed ideas or expressions from a plain-
tiff's copyrighted work. Furthermore, the Nichols opinion suggested that one
could make a general assessment of whether a defendant had borrowed ideas or
expressions by measuring the degree of abstraction inherent in the defendant's
borrowing."2 If the defendant borrowed literally from the plaintiff's work, then
a finding of infringement would follow. By contrast, if a defendant borrowed
only vague and abstract features from the plaintiff, no such finding would be
made.129 Over time, this approach came to dominate our analysis of copyright
infringement."'
2. Natural Law in Modern Copyright Doctrine
So far, this section has described the development of copyright's general
shape since Wheaton v. Peters. Although our early notions of copyright were
very limited, copyright now protects nearly all creations of an author's mind,' 3
subject to the limitation of the idea/expression dichotomy. Brief reflection
reveals the close relationship between this copyright regime and the natural law
of property through labor and possession.
For example, the natural law tradition that property is the necessary moral
consequence of a person's labor accurately describes our present doctrine that
copyright protects creations of an author's mind. As Locke pointed out, if a
person owns her labor as a matter of inherent right, then that person should
125. Id. at 121.
126. Id.
127. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954), in which the Supreme Court
noted that "a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of
the idea-not the idea itself."
128. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1931).
129. Id. at 122.
130. See, e.g., Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
980 (1976) ("It is an axiom of copyright law that the protection granted to a copyrightable work extends only to
the expression of an idea and never to the idea itself."). See also Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer
Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 88, §
13.03[A][I].
131. It is worth mentioning here that these creations must also be "fixed" before copyright protection at-
taches. See infra note 142.
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own the fruits of that labor as well.'312 Under this reasoning, an author owns her
mind's labor, and must also own the creations of that labor, no matter how
humble or accidental the result.
The appropriateness of this reference to natural law becomes even more
clear when one considers the fact that copyright law protects works for which
no economic incentive is required to induce creation. For example, copyright
undoubtedly protects works authored by students to fulfill academic require-
ments. 13 3 Similarly, copyright protects the results of accidents" 4  and products
which the government requires public utilities to print. 3 5 If economic necessity
were truly the only motivation for copyright, we would remove copyright protec-
tion from these works and any others which would be produced in the absence
of copyright. Granting these works copyright induces no economic gain. If any-
thing, economic welfare would increase if the public gained free access to these
works through a denial of copyright. Our reluctance to take such a course of
action demonstrates the natural law vindication of an author's creation in our
copyright law. 36
The natural law roots of the idea/expression dichotomy are even more
striking. As noted previously, modern doctrine identifies ideas as more abstract
than expressions." 37 This distinction speaks directly to natural law doctrines of
132. J. LOCKE, supra note 38, §§ 27-28.
133. As noted previously, copyright protects all works which are the fruits of an individual's mental labor.
Neither this principle, nor its codification in section 102(a) of the Copyright Code, contains an exclusion for
academic works.
134. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
135. Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Dir. Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding "nothing
in the Copyright Act to support the District Court's conclusion that [plaintiff] Hutchinson's directory is excluded
from copyright protection on the ground that Hutchinson is required by law to publish a directory."). Interest-
ingly, the Copyright Code excludes works of the United States government. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1976).
136. Although it is outside the scope of this Article to go beyond judicial interpretation of basic copyright
concepts, congressional enactments also contain references to the natural law.
Most significantly, recent United States adherence to the Berne Convention implies legislative recognition of
copyright's natural law dimensions. For example, the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988), eliminated certain formal prerequisites to copyright protection. In particular,
notice of copyright is no longer required to keep a work from falling into the public domain. Id. § 7, (amending 17
U.S.C. §§ 401-02 (1976)). Although minor, such a change suggests a natural law orientation because it seemingly
codifies the notion that copyright is the inevitable consequence of an author's creative labor. This orientation is
further supported by article one of the Berne Convention, which states, "The countries to which this Convention
applies constitute a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works." Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works, art. I (as revised July 24, 1971) (emphasis added).
Adherence to such language certainly implies recognition of the the fact that something more than economic
convenience supports copyright.
Further reference to natural law exists in section 801 of the 1976 Copyright Code. That section creates the
independent Copyright Royalty Tribunal which adjusts royalty rates paid under compulsory licensing of copy-
righted works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-02, 801(b)(2) (1976). Although section 801 recognizes economic objectives for
the Tribunal, it also commands the Tribunal "ftlo afford the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work
. . ." Id. § 801(b)(1)(B) (1976). Such language clearly demonstrates something less than a purely economic
outlook on copyright law, for considerations of fairness are not part of a blind pursuit of efficiency.
Finally, sections 201(e), 203 and 304(c) of the Copyright Code (which deal with involuntary transfers and
the termination of transfers) seem grounded in natural law, and not economies. See P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT,
vol. I. at 9 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 123 (1976) ("The purpose of [section 201(e)]
is to reaffirm the basic principle that the United States copyright of an individual author shall be secured to that
author...").
137. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 902
(1931).
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inherent possessability. Expressions such as the text of a work are the proper
subject of copyright because they are sufficiently concrete for the law to trans-
form them into property. By contrast, ideas are so incorporeal that the law sim-
ply cannot make them into property.1 38
The natural law ancestry of the idea/expression dichotomy is confirmed
when one considers the judicial precedent on which Learned Hand rested his
levels of abstractions test. In Nichols, Learned Hand cited directly to page
eighty-six of the Supreme Court case of Holmes v. Hurst,"39 where the Court
states as follow: "[t]he right thus secured by the copyright act is not a right to
the use of certain words, because they are the common property of the human
race, and are as little susceptible of private appropriation as air or sunlight."' 40
The Holmes Court further cited to the English case of Jefferys v. Boo-
sey, 141 where Mr. Justice Erle wrote the following:
The subject of property is the order of words in the author's composition; not the
words themselves, they being analogous to the elements of matter, which are not ap-
propriated unless combined, nor the ideas expressed by those words, they existing in
the mind alone, which is [sic] not capable of appropriation' 4'2
The recognition of copyright's natural law heritage demonstrates a clear
contradiction between the modern economic model of copyright and copyright's
actual description. Although economic analysis has undoubtedly affected copy-
right development, copyright's basic concepts appear tied to the natural law of
property. In turn, this shows that copyright is based on something more than
mere economic efficiency, and that we should restore natural law to our copy-
right jurisprudence to reflect this broader perspective. Indeed, failure to take
such a course of action places copyright theory at odds with judicial practice.
138. The origin of this notion can be traced directly to Roman times. In an apparent reference to res com-
munes, the Roman Seneca stated that "ideas are common property." Epistles 12, 11 as quoted in M. NIMMER &
D. NIMMER, supra note 88, § 16.01 n.4. See also 7 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 480 (1926)
("according to Roman law, occupatio, being founded on possessio, and only corporeal things being capable of
possessio, it was only corporeal things which could be thus acquired.").
The English adoption of this reasoning can be clearly seen in Justice Yates' dissenting opinion in Millar in
which he wrote the following:
The claim is to the style and ideas of the author's composition. And it is a well known and established
maxim, (which I apprehend holds as true now, as it did 2000 years ago,) 'that nothing can be an object of
property, which has not a corporeal substance.'
98 Eng. Rep. 201, 232 (1769). Justice Yates further bolstered his argument with a reference toferae naturae. Id.
at 233.
139. 174 U.S. 82 (1898).
140. Id. at 86.
141. 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854).
142. Id. at 702. Further confirmation of the inherent unpossessability of ideas can be found in Desny v.
Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 731 (1956), in which the court wrote that "ideas are free as the air."
Further evidence of modern copyright's concern with possession can be seen in the requirement of "fixation."
Under section 102(a) of the Copyright Code, copyright extends to "original works of authorship," but only if
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). In other words, a work must be cap-
tured in some fashion which enables the work to be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated." Id. This
is accomplished if a work is written down, captured on audio or video tape, or placed on a computer disk. See H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976). Although this condition is easily met, it does prevent statutory
copyright from protecting works which are not physically recorded in some fashion. The logic behind the require-
ment is clear. Without reduction to a physically tangible form, possession is not possible, and property will not be
recognized. See Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 83 n.44 (1985).
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This may decrease the value of insights gained from copyright theory. Of
course, one might also take the position that we should extinguish the natural
law facets of our present copyright doctrine in favor of the economics-only
model constructed earlier. However, grave difficulty confronts such a course of
action, for economics is simply too blunt a tool to successfully prescribe all of
copyright law.
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The normative use of economics in copyright suffers from, among other
things, the problems inherent in defining and measuring society's welfare. To be
sure, certain components may be known in a general fashion, but constructing a
scale which successfully measures the existence and value of each of these com-
ponents is impossible. Indeed, the very construction of such a scale would cer-
tainly involve the identification and evaluation of rights implicit in natural law
reasoning. This realization alone weakens the basis for grounding copyright the-
ory in economics alone.14' Nevertheless, two methods for dealing with this prob-
lem have been proposed and might be used to evaluate copyright law. However,
even if one of these methods were deemed desirable, it alone could not guide all
of the decisions we must make in shaping our copyright law. In other words, an
economic analysis of copyright cannot be implemented without also considering
the natural law.
A. Pareto Optimality
The first of these methods uses the concepts of Pareto superiority and
Pareto optimality. Situation A is Pareto superior to situation B if in situation A:
1) at least one person is better off than she was in situation B and 2) no one is
worse off than he was in situation B. Situation A is Pareto optimal if no Pareto
superior positions to it exist. In other words, situation A is Pareto optimal if no
person can be made better off without making at least one other person worse
off.1
4 4
At first blush, the Pareto principle seems an attractive way out of the
problems which face the economic analysis of copyright. Since Pareto superior
moves involve gains for some and losses for none, they increase welfare by defi-
nition. The right series of Pareto superior copyright improvements would there-
fore lead to the best of all possible copyright regimes. Unfortunately, closer
examination reveals the fallacy of naked obeisance to the Pareto principle.
First, the Pareto principle does not lead to one Pareto optimal solution.
Thus, even if a Pareto optimal situation has been identified, Paretianism says
nothing about whether that situation is preferable to any other Pareto optimal
solution. Second, the Pareto principle is not capable of comparing all possible
situations against one another. If a proposed change improves the welfare of one
143. For another exploration of the problems associated with basing copyright solely on economics, see
Gordon, supra note 3, at 1435-68.
144. J. COLEMAN, MARKETS. MORALS AND THE LAW 97-98 (1988).
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group at the expense of another, it is neither Pareto superior nor Pareto inferior
to the existing status quo. In such situations of Pareto noncomparability, the
Pareto principle has no preference for one scheme over another.
The above described problems follow from consideration of the following
diagram. Let the x and y axes represent the welfare of individuals (or groups of
individuals) A and B respectively. Let the point E represent the existing distri-
bution of the resources available to A and B. From this construction, we can see
that all points to the "northwest" of E are Pareto superior to E, and all points
to the "southwest" are Pareto inferior to E.145 Of course, there is at some point
a limit to the welfare that can be derived from the resources in this society. The
frontier of this welfare is represented by the curve PQ. Indeed, the set of points
represented by PQ is the set of all Pareto optimal distributions.146
y N
P
M
E
x
Q
The first problem with relying solely on Paretianism follows easily from
this diagram. Since PQ represents the set of Pareto optimal distributions, our
hypothesized society must choose where along PQ to allocate its resources.
However, the Pareto principle is incapable of choosing among these points be-
cause each of the points on PQ is neither Pareto superior nor Pareto inferior to
the other points on PQ. For example, group B is better off at point N than it is
at point M. Conversely, group A is worse off at point N than it is at point M.
Thus, point N can be considered neither Pareto superior nor Pareto inferior to
M. Society's preference for a particular distribution along PQ must therefore be
based on principles other than Pareto superiority and Pareto optimality. 147
The second problem follows quickly as well. Since our society is presently
at point E, the possible Pareto superior results are contained in the pie slice
bounded by EMN. The possible Pareto optimal points to choose from are there-
fore contained on the subset of PQ marked MN. Points not on MN cannot be
considered because they are Pareto noncomparable to E.148 This shows that the
145. Points to the "northwest" of E are Pareto superior because they represent points at which the welfare of
both A and B is increased or unchanged. Similarly, points to the "southwest" of E are Pareto inferior because
they represent points at which the welfare of both A and B is decreased or unchanged. By contrast, other points
are considered Pareto noncomparable to E because the welfare of one group is improved at the expense of the
other.
146. Points which are either Pareto superior to the points on PQ must be to the "northwest," of PQ. Since no
such points exist, the points of PQ must be Pareto optimal.
147. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTiCE 67-69 ("The principle of [Pareto] efficiency does not by itself
select one particular distribution of commodities as the efficient one. To select among the efficient distributions
some other principle, a principle of justice, say, is necessary.").
148. It must be remembered that the Pareto principle cannot compare point E with points not on MN be-
cause those points are neither to the northwest or southwest of E.
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Pareto principle eliminates many possible Pareto optimal arrangements simply
because the excluded arrangements cannot be Pareto compared to the status
quo. Since these excluded points are Pareto optimal, they are-by defini-
tion-one of the arrangements of society's resources that must be considered as
desirable as the ones included on MN. Their exclusion is unwarranted unless
some other theory such as natural law justifies the existing arrangement at point
E.
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that Paretianism alone is not ca-
pable of prescribing a single regime of copyright. First, Pareto reasoning implies
more than one optimal arrangement. Second, the possible arrangements are se-
lected over other equally Pareto desirable arrangements only because they are
compatible with the preexisting, unjustified arrangement. A principle other than
Paretianism is therefore required to justify an initial arrangement and select
from the remaining Pareto optimal solutions.
B. Wealth Maximization
The second suggested method of measuring social welfare uses the concept
of wealth as its scale. Adherents to this view would select the copyright regime
which maximized society's total wealth,'49 regardless of its distribution. °50 This
method seems peculiarly compatible with copyright's basic economic theory.
New authorship spurred by copyright adds to society's wealth by creating new
works of value. These gains are then compared against the losses imposed by
copyright. The optimal degree of copyright protection is that regime which
maximizes the difference between the economic gains and losses caused by
copyright.' 51
The allure of this analysis is plain. It offers a theoretically unique, determi-
nate result to the difficult problem of how far to extend copyright. All that is
required is sufficient economic knowledge to gather the information necessary to
compute society's wealth. Beyond that, a simply mechanical determination leads
us to the maximization of society's welfare.
Unfortunately, closer examination of wealth maximization reveals its flaws.
At the very outset, serious ethical problems surround the choice of wealth as the
sole measure of societal welfare. Although wealth is certainly something that
149. The leading proponent of this analysis, Judge Richard Posner, defines wealth as the following:
[Tihe value in dollars or dollar equivalents. . . of everything in society. It is measured by what people are
willing to pay for something or, if they already own it, what they demand in money to give it up. The only
kind of preference that counts in a system of wealth maximization is thus one that is backed up by
money-in other words, that is registered in a market.
Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979).
150. This concept is sometimes referred to as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Under this conception, situation A is
Kaldor-Hicks superior to situation B if in situation A: I) at least one person is better off than she was in situation
B and 2) those persons who are better off in situation A (the "winners") are capable of retaining some of their
gains while compensating those who have become worse off in situation A (the "losers"). In other words, situation
A is Kaldor-Hicks superior to situation B if situation A is potentially Pareto superior to situation B. See Fisher,
supra note 3 at 1699; J. COLEMAN, supra note 144, at 98-100.
151. Indeed, economically oriented copyright analysts often adopt the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as
copyright's touchstone. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 3, at 1703, 1717; Landes & Posner, supra note 3 at 326.
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society values, it is not the only thing that society values.152 Thus, if wealth
maximization truly identifies the optimal social order, it must do so because a
society which maximizes wealth necessarily observes all other values worth rec-
ognizing. 153 In my view, such an assumption is patently unrealistic. Since
wealth maximization responds only to those values which are backed up by
money in a market,15 4 there is simply no reason to believe that a society which
values wealth will also properly respect values which are not bought and sold
such as freedom 55 and privacy. 56
Even if these ethical problems are overlooked, there is little reason for
copyright analysts to put all of their faith in wealth maximization. First, pursuit
of wealth maximization requires information which is simply not available. Sec-
ond, wealth maximization's reliance on prices raises the risk of fatal indetermi-
nacy. Third, wealth maximization often justifies whatever set of entitlements is
proposed.
1. Lack of Information
The normative use of wealth maximization in copyright proceeds as fol-
lows.' 57 First, a judge must identify all of the work's potential uses. 58 Second,
the judge must rank the possible uses in order of the relative costs and benefits
of allowing them. 59 This involves, among other things, determining how
changes in copyright law might motivate authors to write, ascertaining the mar-
ket behavior of potential defendants and consumers of each potential infringing
use, and evaluating other uses to which authors might put their labors. 60 Fi-
nally, the judge must select the copyright law which maximizes the benefits of
copyright protection over the associated losses.' 6'
Brief reflection reveals the practical impossibility of undertaking such an
endeavor. No judge (or legislature, for that matter) could ever identify all of
the possible uses of a work. Moreover, the empirical information necessary to
152. See Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
153. See . COLEMAN, supra note 144, at 112 ("If the pursuit of wealth is a good, it must be because
pursuing wealth promotes other things of value.").
154. See supra note 149.
155. This is most vividly illustrated by the many commentators who point out that wealth maximization may
well justify slavery. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 152, at 208-10. See also Bebhuck, The Pursuit of a Bigger
Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 687-88 (1980).
156. Even economists have questioned the ethical wisdom of using wealth maximization as society's norma-
tive criterion. See E.J. MISHAN. THE ECONOMIC GROWTH DEBATE 36 (1977) ("[W]ho doubts that the wealthier
and economically more efficient society can also be the less healthy, the less honest, the less secure and the less
contented?"); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 646 (1980) (pointing out that markets do
not reflect the value of moralisms).
157. A detailed analysis of this process was recently presented by Professor William Fisher in his article
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HAIRY. L. REV. 1659, 1698-744 (1989). Professor Fisher also provides a
utopian theory of copyright law based upon his vision of an ideal society. Id. at 1744-95. To the extent that
Professor Fisher's work points out the shortcomings of wealth maximization and the necessity for some other
approach to copyright, I am in agreement. To the extent that Professor Fisher supports the sole reliance upon
wealth maximization to guide copyright, I disagree.
158. Id. at 1706.
159. Id. at 1707.
160. Id. at 1705-17.
161. Id. at 1716-17.
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calculate the effect of copyright law on the actions of authors, potential defend-
ants, and consumers is simply unavailable, and is probably uncollectible."'
Without this information, we cannot predict whether a given change in copy-
right will even increase production of works,'6 3 let alone increase social wel-
fare."'4 The problem becomes even worse when simplifying assumptions are re-
moved.16 5 Consequently, there is little justification for placing all of our faith in
economic analysis as a workable method for shaping copyright in any meaning-
ful fashion.'
162. See Litman, supra note 24 ("Most arguments over the appropriate scope of copyright protection, unfor-
tunately, occur in a realm in which empirical data is not only unavailable, but is literally uncollectible."); Perlman
& Rhinelander, Willams & Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying, Copyright, and the Judicial Process,
1975 Sup. Cr. REv. 355, 373-79 ("The difficulties with utilizing economic theory to justify the creation of a
judicial privilege to copy copyrighted works is that neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis exists upon which
to evaluate the claims of either party.").
163. In order to calculate whether or not an increase in copyright protection really will stimulate creative
activity, aa economist would require an accurate model of authors' motives for writing. Cf. Auten, Burman, &
Randolph, Estimation and Interpretation of Capital Gains Realization Behavior: Evidence from Panel Data, 42
NAT'L TAx J. 353 (1989) ("Absent a clear behavioral model, econometric analysis is as much art as science and
artistic interpretations clearly vary on this subject."). Describing and analyzing these motives seems impossible.
Besides the possibility of copyright benefits, authors' motives presumably include desire for fame, politics, and
non-copyright monetary benefits. Their relative importance would have to be established for the authors of every
type of copyrightable work. See Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REv.
420, 425-26 (1966). The modeling of authors' behavior is further complicated by the fact that individuals appar-
ently do not value equivalent economic options consistently. See Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions
and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 457 (1981).
164. One might attempt to equate the production of more works with an increase in social welfare. Such an
assumption is not necessarily valid, for increased production of works induced by copyright implies a diversion of
resources from other sectors of the economy to the creation of copyrightable works. Thus, the production of more
copyrightable works increases social welfare only if the increased production is more valuable than the use which
previously occupied the diverted resources.
165. Despite presenting a model for use of the wealth maximizing copyright model, Professor Fisher himself
noted:
If we removed the simplifying assumptions, limited the judge's investigatory power, and burdened him
with other cases, it would be ludicrous, surely, to ask him to undertake an inquiry like the one outlined
above. Perhaps. It is hard to imagine a judge making even rough guesses at some of the figures critical to
the calculus. Especially implausible are the notions that he would be able, or willing, to ascertain the
universe of ways in which copyrights in the type of work before him are susceptible of being infringed and
that he could estimate the effects of different levels of remuneration on the future production of works of
that sort.
Fisher, supra note 3, at 1718-19.
166. Indeed, Professor George Priest has characterized the economic analysis of patent law as "one of the
least productive lines of inquiry in all of economic thought." Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers, in
RESEARCH IN LAW & ECON., vol. 8, at 19 (J. Palmer & R. Zerbe, eds. 1986). In Priest's view, this problem arises
because "[tihe ratio of empirical demonstration to assumption in this literature must be very close to zero." Id.
He concludes that "It]he inability of economists to resolve the question of whether activity stimulated by the
patent system or other forms of protection of intellectual property enhances or diminishes social welfare implies,
unfortunately, that economists can tell lawyers ultimately very little about how to enforce or interpret the law of
intellectual property." Id. at 21. Under these conditions, "economic analysis is very hard to distinguish in practice
from applied moral philosophy." Id. at 22.
Professor Peter Menelt's thoughtful economic analysis of computer programs and copyright provides an ex-
ample of the problems to which Professor Priest alludes. See Menell, supra note 3. Professor Mcneil takes the
position that courts should strongly limit the protection of computer program code. Id. at 1084-88. The article
proceeds by identifying a number of costs associated with extending copyright to computer code. The article
contends that these costs justify the proposed limits on copyright because legal and economic factors besides
copyright provide sufficient incentives to assure the optimal production of desired programs. Id. at 1079-84.
Although I am in sympathy with Professor Menell's conclusion, his analysis is incomplete because he fails to
assess the possibility of extending copyright protection for computer programs beyond his proposal. In particular,
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2. Changing Prices and Endowment Effects
Theoretical problems also beset the normative use of wealth maximization.
These problems arise when we take account of the fact that a society's prices
change as entitlements like copyright are shifted. These changing prices mean
that wealth maximization may be incapable of selecting an optimal copyright
scheme even if the practical problems identified above disappear.
In the most striking case, price changes caused by a wealth maximization
policy suggest a never ending flip flop of rights in which copyright is expanded
and contracted as the relative prices of intellectual products change. 6 7 For ex-
ample, consider a society in which books and movies on video cassette are val-
ued in the following manner. If 100 books are authored in a given year, then the
books are valued at $2 each. If 200 books are authored, their prices reflect the
increased supply of books and the price falls to $1 each. Similarly, if 100 movies
on video cassette are produced, their price is $2 each, but if 200 are produced,
the price falls to $1 each. Let situation A denote the production of 100 books
and 200 movies, and let situation B denote the production of 200 books and 100
movies.
Suppose that in situation A, the law permits the free production of video
cassette movies from books. Under this regime, 100 books and 200 video cas-
sette movies are produced. Since the 100 books sell for $2 each and the 200
movies for $1 each, society's wealth from this output is $400. Suppose further
that if the law were changed to prohibit the free video cassette movie produc-
tion from books, situation B would result. The production of books would rise to
200, and the production of movies would fall to 100."18 At these prices, the
contemplated change in the law would increase society's wealth to $500.1es A
copyright regime based upon wealth maximization would therefore adopt the
change.
Unfortunately, the apparent increase in society's wealth is temporary, at
best. Once the change was made, the production of books would rise to 200, and
the production of movies would fall to 100. The new relative abundance of
books, coupled with the relative scarcity of movies would cause a change in
he apparently assumes that the only incentive required to spur authorship of computer programs is the recovery of
development costs. The relative ease of recovering these costs through means other than copyright leads to the
conclusion that most computer programs would be authored in the absence of legal protection. Id. at 1060, 1080-
81. This assumption overlooks the possibility that extending copyright beyond Professor Menell's limits would
attract even more resources to the authorship of computer programs. These resources would presumably produce a
socially desired increase in authorship.
Of course, it is possible that costs of extending copyright beyond Professor Menell's proposal would outweigh
any concomitant benefits. However, in the absence of detailed information about the preferences of producers and
consumers of computer programs, the economic validity of Professor Menell's position or any alternative remains a
matter of conjecture. As I later discuss, natural law provides alternate justifications for limiting copyright's reach.
See infra notes 187-238 and accompanying text.
167. This phenomenon is explained by the so-called Scitovsky Paradox. See Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare
Propositions in Economics, 9 REv. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941).
168. The drop in movie production would occur because the cost of producing movies would increase as
authors enforced their new rights under the law. Similarly, the extra economic incentives to authors would stimu-
late further authorship.
169. 200 books at $2 each + 100 video cassette movies at S1 each = S500.
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prices. Based upon these new prices, society's wealth would fall back to $400.170
Even worse, the new prices in situation B imply a change back to the old law of
situation A. At the prices prevalent in situation B, a return to situation A would
increase society's wealth to $500.'7' However, prices would soon change again,
thereby causing yet another move to situation B.
A similar, but different, problem occurs when attention is focused on the
endowment effects of copyright. Endowment effects are the result of the well
known fact that the price a person is willing to pay for an entitlement is gener-
ally less than what she will sell the entitlement for once she owns it. 7 2 Since
those who own entitlements such as copyright are likely to value them more
than those who do not, the wealth maximizer naturally prefers to assign rights
according to the status quo. This turns wealth maximization into a normative
principle which tends to justify whatever status quo is proposed.'7 3
Consider proposal C. If proposal C is adopted, the producers of records
own the right to make cassette tapes from the records they produce. Producers
value this right at $200 because this is the additional revenue that they can gain
by making and selling cassette tapes to the consumers of tapes. Suppose further
that consumers would be willing to buy the rights of making cassette tapes, but
only if the price were $190 or less. In this hypothesized situation, proposal C
seems clearly wealth maximizing and should be adopted. Since producers value
the right more than consumers do, wealth is maximized by assigning the right
to producers.
For purposes of comparison, now consider proposal D, which is the opposite
of proposal C. Consumers now have the right to freely make cassette tapes from
records. Because of endowment effects, consumers in situation D price the enti-
tlement that they own more highly than the entitlement they did not own in
situation C. Suppose that they consequently will not part with the right for
anything less than $203. Under these facts, proposal D is preferable to proposal
C, and should be adopted.
The foregoing analysis shows that although wealth maximization seems at-
tractive, it is no more worthy of unswerving allegiance than is Pareto optimal-
ity. From a purely practical point of view, the huge amount of information re-
quired to make intelligent policy recommendations is not presently available,
and it may never be available. 74 Furthermore, even if the information were
available, there is simply no certainty that wealth maximization is capable of
recommending a preferred course of action. First, wealth maximization's reli-
ance on prices raises the risk that society will endlessly flip flop between com-
170. Under the new prices, society would have 200 books at $I each + 100 video cassette movies at $2 each
$400.
171. Society would then have 100 books at $1 each + 200 video cassette movies at $2 each = $500.
172. Endowment effects arise from many causes. In some cases, the increased welfare which results from
owning an entitlement changes the marginal utility of each dollar to an individual. See E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENE-
FIT ANALYSIS 133-34, 424-25 (1976). In other cases, the phenomenon may be the result of cognitive processes. See
Sunstein, Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHIi. L. REv. 1129, 1151 (1986).
173. Id. at 140-41, 398-401; Rizzo, supra note 156, at 648-49.
174. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
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peting alternatives.1 75 Even if such a situation does not arise, endowment effects
imply that the wealth maximizing society will often favor whatever initial as-
signment of rights is proposed.178
These conclusions have severe implications for present copyright jurispru-
dence. Since economic analysis is ineffective at distinguishing among the many
initial assignments which may be proposed, its use as copyright's sole normative
touchstone is demonstrably incomplete. If society is to choose between divergent
copyright regimes which seem Pareto optimal or are backed as plausibly wealth
maximizing, it must resort to some process of reasoning outside of economics.
We cannot repair the descriptive contradiction between economics and copy-
right doctrine by simply clinging harder to a solely economic copyright jurispru-
dence. 17 7 Instead, we must directly confront the natural law tradition which al-
ready exists in our copyright law.
III. NATURAL LAW LIMITS ON COPYRIGHT LAW
Natural law's ubiquity within our copyright tradition makes it the logical
candidate for dealing with the economic model's demonstrated inability to select
or justify the initial entitlements to property which copyright law must define.
First, the use of natural law would be consistent with copyright's general
description. Second, natural law justifies the initial assignment of copyright to
authors and suggests limits on the extent of those assignments. 78 This implies
that a natural law perspective might be useful in defining the issues at stake in
copyright law.
Despite the promise inherent in this proposal, the inclusion of natural law
in modern copyright jurisprudence has encountered considerable resistance. Al-
though some of this resistance is based upon the overstated position that copy-
right developed strictly as an economic instrument,' the real heart of the resis-
tance comes from the belief that natural law implies an unprincipled expansion
of authors' rights which will run amok over the public interest in free access to
works.
Such fears are understandable. Locke's views on property stemmed from
his assumption that persons owned their bodies.'8 " They therefore owned the
labor of their bodies and, by extension, the product of their labor.' 8 ' This argu-
175. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
177. In commenting on how an economist should proceed when confronted with inconsistent recommenda-
tions of the sort identified in this Article, economist E.J. Mishan has written, "In such cases, the proper thing for
the economist to do is to reveal to the public these disparate results, along with any other relevant considerations
such as equity or distributional impact. Economics alone cannot take him further." E.J. MISHAN, supra note 172,
at 401. Mishan's statement elegantly captures the realization that society can successfully arrange its affairs only
by venturing beyond the walls of economics.
178. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
179. As noted previously, there is ample support for the proposition that copyright developed in part as an
economic social policy tool. See supra notes 3-14, 54-60, 78-81 and accompanying text. However, to state that
copyright's economic heritage is its only heritage takes the proposition too far. Copyright has unmistakable natu-
ral law roots. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
180. J. LOCKE, supra note 38, § 27.
181. Id., §§ 27-28.
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ment seems peculiarly applicable to authorship. An author owns her body, and
therefore her mind. When her mind labors, it seems that the resulting work is
not just the product of the author's labor, it is practically an extension of the
author herself. The book is therefore original, and it seems particularly appro-
priate to grant the author broad property rights in her book and all that it
embodies. 182
The standard response to these fears is the suppression of copyright's natu-
ral law dimensions in favor of the familiar economic model.183 However, the
shortcomings of economic analysis identified in this Article suggest that this
suppression actually increases the likelihood of unprincipled expansion in copy-
right law by permitting unsophisticated notions about the connection between
labor and property to drive judicial application of copyright law. If courts try to
decide cases on economic principles, they necessarily find that those principles
provide little guidance." 4 They are then forced to decide cases on something
else, namely their unguided intuition about what is practical, fair and just.
Since Lockean philosophy heavily influences our general intuition about prop-
erty, the courts' unguided intuition often involves an uncritical use of natural
law principles in which property follows labor. When this unguided intuition
joins the plaintiff's economic argument that more copyright protection necessa-
rily improves welfare by inducing more creative labor, the continued expansion
of copyright would hardly seem surprising. 5
The foregoing problem implies that a better way to prevent copyright's un-
limited expansion is the careful development of a natural law copyright juris-
prudence which recognizes the shortcomings of economics and uses natural law
to surmount those problems. In particular, careful use of natural law principles
creates a vibrant public domain which limits the unwarranted expansion of au-
thors' rights. First, the practical notions embodied in the Roman notions of res
communes and ferae naturae admonish the natural law thinker not to extend
copyright beyond the bounds of what human institutions such as copyright can
practicably accomplish. Second, the moral principles which suggest the exten-
sion of copyright also justify the dedication of authors' works to the public
domain.186
182. Indeed, it is generally assumed by many commentators that the use of natural law inevitably leads to
the endless expansion of author's rights. The intuitive desire to limit copyright's scope is perhaps one reason that
we have often insisted that natural law should be ignored in copyright jurisprudence. Cf. Patterson, supra note 49,
at 1210.
183. See Patterson, supra note 49, at 1210 (rejecting natural rights theory as containing no limits on copy-
right's expansion). See also Abrams, supra note 57, at 1185-87.
184. See supra notes 145-77 and accompanying text.
185. Indeed, I would argue that we may already be observing the scenario outlined here in the seemingly
arbitrary and expansive results of recent copyright cases. Cf. Yen, supra note 17, at 407-20, 432 n.197 for a
description of copyright expansion and its economic support. See infra notes 190-206 and accompanying text for a
description of the divergent results in modern copyright law.
186. It is worth reminding the reader that my purpose is not to finally settle the complete shape of modern
copyright doctrine. Rather, my purpose is to demonstrate how the natural law creates a strong public domain. In
so doing, I will necessarily have to consider some of the natural law's normative consequences. However, this
consideration does not require a complete explanation for all facets of copyright law. Such a task is beyond the
scope of this Article.
1990]
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A. Copyright and Possession
The idea/expression dichotomy's roots in res communes and ferae naturae
provide the most obvious way in which the natural law creates a public domain.
As the reader will recall, these concepts prohibited property claims in those
objects which were by nature difficult to possess. They therefore imply that
copyright should not be extended to those facets of a work which are difficult to
possess. Those facets should be placed in the public domain.
Understanding how possession limits copyright starts with a brief explora-
tion of problems inherent in our present economic interpretation of the idea/
expression dichotomy. Despite the seemingly sensible result of Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp.,18 7 future courts construing the idea/expression dichotomy
had little luck in ascertaining copyright's limits. Even though Hand's levels of
abstraction test became the dominant focus of future infringement cases,' 88 the
test itself suffered because it did not specify the level of abstraction which sepa-
rated idea from expression. Future courts knew that ideas were less concrete
than expressions, but they did not know where along this continuum to "draw
the line."'18 9 Not surprisingly, this has resulted in a wide variance between copy-
right decisions. In some cases, courts have interpreted the idea/expression di-
chotomy so that a plaintiff finds it very difficult to prove infringement. In
others, courts have made it easy for plaintiffs to recover.
For example, in Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co.,'9 0 the Second
Circuit considered the plaintiff Eden's claim that a stuffed snowman manufac-
tured by the defendant Marshall Field infringed a similar snowman manufac-
tured by Eden and previously sold to Marshall Field."'1 The features of the two
snowmen were generally similar. Both resembled two snowballs stacked atop
one another. They shared nearly identical dimensions, black button eyes approx-
imately one-half inch in diameter, red buttons, black hats and scarves.' 9' Eden
claimed that these similarities proved copyright infringement., a The court
disagreed.
In finding for the defendant, the court separated the ideas embodied in
Eden's snowman from their expressions.1 9 In the court's view, the idea of a
snowman made of snowballs included the general shape, size, and features of
the plaintiff's work.'95 Any similarities between the two snowmen were there-
187. 45 rF.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). This case is discussed supra at notes
122-30 and accompanying text.
188. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977)
("No court or commentator in making this search has been able to improve upon Judge Learned Hand's famous
'abstractions test' articulated in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.").
189. Indeed, Hand himself admitted that, "[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary [between idea
and expression), and nobody ever can." Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
190. 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982).
191. Id. at 499.
192. Id. at 500. The degree of similarity can be appreciated only by looking at pictures of the two snowmen.
The pictures are printed at C. JOYCE, COPYRIGHT LAW 626-27 (1986).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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fore similarities of idea, and not expression. x96 Thus, the plaintiff's claim had to
be rejected. 97
By contrast, in Animal Fair, Inc. v. AMFESCO Indus.,198 the District
Court of Minnesota considered two similar pairs of bedroom slippers which
were made in the shape of a bear's paws. 99 The defendant argued that the
plaintiff's claim was an attempt to monopolize the idea of slippers in the shape
of a bear's paw.2 °0 This argument failed. Instead, the court held that the plain-
tiff sought only to protect its "fun-loving" and "whimsical" 0' expression of a
bear's paw.102 Since the defendant's slippers also captured a similar "total con-
cept and feel," the court found that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's
artistic expression. In so ruling, the court specifically considered and disre-
garded various differences between the two pairs of slippers.20  The court then
entered a preliminary injunction in the plaintiff's favor.204
When one considers cases like Eden Toys and Animal Fair, it becomes
apparent that our present interpretation of the idea/expression dichotomy suf-
fers from the contrasting attitudes which one can bring to the separation of idea
from expression. On the one hand, cases like Eden Toys indicate that even
fairly concrete facets of a work are ideas. Thus, a plaintiff can prove infringe-
ment only by showing that the defendant borrowed verbatim a significant por-
tion of the plaintiff's work. On the other hand, cases like Animal Fair imply
that very nonliteral facets of a work are copyrightable. Therefore, a plaintiff
can succeed even if the defendant's work bears only a superficial resemblance to
the plaintiff's work. 05
If our standard economic view of copyright is applied to this problem, no
clear limits on the implications of cases like Animal Fair emerge. Those in
196. Id.
197. Id. at 501.
198. 620 F. Supp. 175 (D. Minn. 1985), affid without opinion, 794 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986).
199. Id. at 177. Photographs of these slippers may be found at A. LATMAN. R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG,
COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 428 (1989).
200. Animal Fair, 620 F. Supp. at 187.
201. Id. at 178.
202. Id. at 187.
203. Id. at 188.
204. Id. at 192.
205. An excellent example of this reasoning is Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). In that case, the plaintiff Steinberg sued the defendants for publishing an advertisement for the
movie Moscow on the Hudson which allegedly infringed Steinberg's well known poster which appeared on the
March 29, 1976 issue of The New Yorker magazine. Id. at 709. Steinberg's illustration offered:
a bird's eye view across a portion of the western edge of Manhattan, past the Hudson River and a tele-
scoped version of the rest of the United States and the Pacific Ocean, to a red strip of horizon, beneath
which are three flat land masses labeled China, Japan and Russia.
Id. at 710. The defendant's poster presented:
the three main characters of the film on the lower third of their poster, superimposed on a bird's eye view
of New York City, and continue[d] east across Manhattan and the Atlantic Ocean, past a rudimentary
evocation of Europe, to a clump of recognizably Russian-styled buildings on the horizon, labeled
"Moscow."
Id. Despite the fact that the posters were different in many ways, the court found for the plaintiff. In so deciding,
the court noted that the defendants could not be held liable for using "the idea of a map of the world from an
egocentrically myopic perspective." Id. at 712. Nevertheless, the court ruled that general similarities in the style,
vantage point, and lettering of the two posters were sufficient to constitute a copying of expression. Id. at 712-14.
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favor of narrow copyright simply argue that the limited incentives provided by
cases like Eden Toys are sufficient to induce production of creative works.
Those taking the opposite view contend that much more protection is needed in
order to encourage the plaintiff's creative labor.2"' However, if we look instead
to natural law doctrines of possession, stronger limits appear.
The necessary insight follows from a reexamination of Wheaton v. Pe-
ters.2"' As noted previously, the Wheaton Court held that copyright in a work
after its first publication existed only as a matter of statutory law, and not as a
matter of common law.208 Although this decision is properly seen primarily as
the rejection of common law copyright, the Court's views on natural law provide
valuable insight as to how we should interpret copyright statutes. The Court
wrote:
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript . . . cannot be
doubted; but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and
exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall have
published it to the world. . . .That every man is entitled to the fruits of his own labor,
must be admitted; but he can enjoy them only, except by statutory provision, under
the rules of property which regulate society, and which define the rights of things in
general.2"9
Two observations are necessary to decipher this passage. First, the Court
accepts the general proposition that a person is entitled to enjoy the fruits of her
labor. Second, the Court refuses to recognize common law copyright because
publication somehow divests the owner of rights "under the rules of property
which regulate society." When one combines these observations with the knowl-
edge that "the rules of property which regulate society"-i.e., the natural
law-are defined by occupation and possession, it seems that the Court was
stating that publication of a work makes further possession of a work
impossible. 10
In other words, an author has a natural right in her manuscript because it
is the product of her labor. That right finds vindication as property because the
author physically possesses the manuscript immediately after writing it. At this
point, the author owns not only the manuscript, but also the intangible ideas
embodied in the work because physical possession of the manuscript enables the
author to prevent others from seeing the intangibles represented in the manu-
script.211 However, once the manuscript is published and the copies are circu-
lated to the public, the author has relinquished possession. As a matter of com-
mon law, the act of publication releases the author's work to the public just as
206. See Litman, supra note 24.
207. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
208. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
209. Id. at 657.
210. Cf. note 43 and accompanying text.
211. See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 231 (1769) (Yates, J., dissenting) ("An author is fully pos-
sessed of his ideas, when they arise in his mind: and therefor from the time these ideas occur to him; or from the
time he writes them down, they are his property."). See also G. CURTIS, supra note 2, at 13:
The right of literary property commences, therefore, from a full and exclusive intellectual possession of his
ideas, by the author, coupled with the physical possession of the combination of characters representing
those ideas, which he has traced upon paper or other material.
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exhaling returns the air in one's lungs to the public.212 Therefore, any post pub-
lication property rights given to the author must be granted by statute.13 Later
decisions enforce this interpretation of Wheaton.2
14
The implications of this reasoning are powerful. It suggests that statutory
copyright was necessary because the property embodied in copyright was con-
sidered so abstract that it was inherently unpossessable as a matter of natural
law. 215 Thus, the common law could not recognize authors' copyrights in their
works, and positive enactments became the only alternative.
Once statutory copyright is seen in this light, we gain new perspective on
the reach of copyright.216 The logic of natural law concepts like res communes
and ferae naturae was that recognition of certain forms of property ran the risk
of being an exercise in futility. 217 It made no sense to make air one person's
permanent property because air could not be possessed. Similarly, when early
American courts held that copyrights were inherently beyond the common law,
they were essentially saying that the intangible nature of copyright made its
possession inherently difficult.21  More importantly, their reasoning implied that
any copyright statute ran the same risk of futility as a statute granting property
212. See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 233-34 (1769) (Yates, J., dissenting).
213. The doctrine that publication divested an author of common law copyright survived from the time of
Wheaton until 1978. Prior to 1978, state common law protected an author's work from the time of creation until
publication. Federal copyright protection attached to a work at the time of publication, but only if the author
complied with the technical requirements of the federal statute. If the author published her work, but failed to
comply with these requirements, both state and federal rights were lost. M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 88,
§ 4.01. The danger that a careless dissemination of a work could divest its author of copyright led to a number of
controversial decisions which appeared to stretch the limits of public dissemination without divestiture of rights.
See, e.g.. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (public performance of dramatic work not general publication);
King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (oral delivery of speech to 200,000 people and
press coverage which quoted entire speech not a general publication). In 1978, the law surrounding publication
and its divestiturg of rights changed when the 1976 Copyright Act took effect. Under the 1976 Act, federal
copyright attached to a work from the moment the author fixed the work in tangible form. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1978).
214. In Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) the court wrote:
An author may be said to be the creator or inventor, both of the ideas contained in his book, and the
combination of %ords to represent them. Before publication he has the exclusive possession of his inven-
tion. His dominion is perfect. But when he has published his book, and given his thoughts, sentiments,
knowledge or discoveries to the world, he can no longer have exclusive possession of them.
Id. at 206. See also Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1133 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763) (adopting the
views of the Stowe court).
215. See Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 162, at 371 ("At common law the difficulty with perceiving a
property interest in intellectual creations resulted from the common law's adherence to possession.").
216. Indeed, this perspective suggests an explanation for the general shape of modern copyright doctrine.
Originality dceloped because the courts instinctively used a conceptual analog of occupatio as the basis for prop-
erty in creative works. Similarly, the idea/expression dichotomy arose as a "response" to originality. Just as the
Romans viewed res communes as an inherent limit on the reach of occupatio, the idea/expression dichotomy
developed as an inherent limit on the reach of copyright. This result reflects natural law's pervasive influence on
our social notions of property.
217. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also Hughes, supra note 23, at 319 (referring to the
common ideas that cannot be granted property status).
218. For a modern expression of this view, see REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE US. COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (House Comm. Print 1961):
Copyright is generally regarded as a form of property, but it is property of a unique kind. It is intangible
and incorporeal. The thing to which the property right attaches-the author's intellectual work-is inca-
pable of possession except as it is embodied in a tangible article such as a manuscript, book, record or
film.
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in air. Thus, the natural law doctrines of possession suggest that copyright stat-
utes should be interpreted so that their fictional possession avoids the risk of
futility. In particular, the idea/expression dichotomy should prevent the exten-
sion of copyright beyond the most concrete and obvious facets of a work."'9 As
the Stowe court wrote:
[The author's] exclusive property in the creation of his mind cannot be vested in the
author as abstractions, but only in the concrete form which he has given them, and the
language in which he has clothed them. When he has sold his book, the only property
which he reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to
multiply the copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to the
eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed. This is what the law terms copy, or
copyright. 2 0
Under this view, literal infringement of a work would be within the idea/ex-
pression dichotomy's natural law boundaries, while claims to a work's perspec-
tive, style, or "total concept and feel" would not be.22
Of course, one might object to this use of natural law on the ground that
modern intangible property rights extend beyond physically possessable objects.
However, the point is not that possession provides a bright line between private
property and the public domain. Instead, the lesson is that we should recognize
the existence of inherent physical or metaphysical limits on the things a person
can claim as property. These limits both explain and justify limiting the expan-
sion of copyright law.
Professor Jessica Litman has recently provided a powerful example of this
sort of natural law reasoning. In her article The Public Domain,"' she analyzes
the reasons that courts have chosen to withhold copyright protection to ideas,
facts, trite plots, and systems. She concludes that the major characteristic
shared by all of these intellectual products is their tendency to "seep" into our
society. 2 3 These products, once published, quickly find their way into the minds
of others. Once there, they are used so often in new works that courts find it
impossible to enforce the claims of their creators. 2 4 Courts therefore routinely
219. This reasoning justifies Professor Menell's conclusion that copyright in computer programs should not
extend far beyond literal copying. See supra note 166. Even if the economic case for limiting copyright is not
clear, the natural law argument is. Abstractions of any work, no matter how useful or original, are too vague and
ephemeral to be capable of possession through copyright.
220. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206-07 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13, 514).
221. 1 should make it clear that I am not advocating a result as narrow as that in Stowe. However, I do
believe that the natural law suggests limits which are more restrictive than the limits which many courts now
perceive. Courts commonly protect a work's perspective, style or "total concept and feel" under the copyright law.
See. e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (protecting style, van-
tage point and lettering of plaintiff's poster); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (protecting the "total concept and feel" of plaintiff's television program); Roth Greet-
ing Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) (protecting the "total concept and feel" of plaintiff's
greeting cards).
222. Litman, supra note 24.
223. Id.
224. Our refusal to permit private appropriation of marks which become generic provides another example of
this reasoning in intellectual property. Even though a term such as "aspirin" might be recognized as private
property, its generic use by the public as the designation for acetyl salicylic acid represents seepage from the
private domain to the public domain. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (D.C.N.Y. 1921). See also
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding the term "light beer" to be
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deny property claims to these things because any attempt to do so through the
copyright law would be futile:
Some aspects of works of authorship are easily absorbed, and once we have absorbed
them, we are likely to make them our own and lose sight of their origins. Ideas, infor-
mation, short phrases, simple plots, themes, stock scenes, and utilitarian solutions to
concrete problems all share this characteristic. It makes them difficult to trace. That
difficulty should make us leery of granting exclusive property rights in such things
without requiring the claimant to offer significant proof in support of her claim of
ownership. . . . To keep [copyright] from defeating its ends, we leave the elements
subject to such absorption free from private claims, even in cases in which we could
determine their initial source.1
25
The foregoing analysis shows that recognition of copyright's relationship to
natural law results in the creation of a public domain. Once we abandon the
notion that the idea/expression dichotomy is a purely economic instrument and
add to our thinking the natural law notion that property extends only to things
which are sufficiently concrete to be possessed, we find reasons to withhold
copyright protection for many products of authorship even though plausible eco-
nomic reasons for protecting them may exist. Copyright must be withheld be-
cause limitations inherent in the human institution of copyright make futile an
attempt to grant private property in these interests. Thus, contrary to the fears
of many copyright analysts, natural law does not lead to the inevitable expan-
sion of authors' rights. If anything, the natural law of possession suggests a
stronger public domain than the one courts might discover through our present
economic model.
generic); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding the term "Ther-
mos" to be generic).
225. Litman, supra note 24. See also id.:
Ideas, systems, themes, plots and scenes are not easily traced. It is difficult to ascertain the source of an
idea and impossible to prove its provenance in any meaningful sense. A court is unable to unzip an au-
thor's head in order to trace the genealogy of her motifs; indeed, the author herself will often be unable to
pin down the root of her inspiration. . . . It is our inability to trace or verify the lineage of ideas that
makes it essential that they be preserved in the public domain.
See also Hughes, supra note 23, at 320-21.
Professor Litman's observation about the problems inherent in possessing ideas through copyright also provide
an explanation for why other intellectual property laws grant rights in what would otherwise appear to be ideas.
For example, patent laws allow claimants to prevent the borrowing of abstract processes embodied in inventions.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1981). Under copyright, these sorts of claims would presumably be disallowed under the idea/
expression dichotomy. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (denying copyright protection to processes, systems, and meth-
ods of operation). If metaphysical notions of possession defeated these property claims in copyright, one might
think that the same result would hold in patent. This is not true, because our patent system is better designed to
identify the owners of intellectual property.
In copyright, rights attach immediately upon creation and fixation. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Since no
systematic review of a copyright's validity occurs before the presumptive creation of property rights, the possibility
that a given author is claiming the same rights as another is very real. As Professor Litman points out, the ensuing
difficulties of identifying the true owner are solved by denying the property claims of all. By contrast, patent
grants property rights only after official review determines that no conflicting property claims exist. 35 U.S.C. §§
131-32 (1981). The claims are narrowed down and recorded so that the extent of the property is well defined and
its owner can be identified. Id. § 135. These procedures alleviate some of the inherent difficulties with copyright
identified by Professor Litman and make possible a somewhat broader possession of intangible property. For addi-
tional discussion of how intellectual property doctrine provides substitutes for the tangible nature of physical
property, see Gordon, supra note 3, at 1378-84.
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B. Copyright and the Moral Consequences of Labor
The practical limits inherent in copyright law provide only half of the natu-
ral law's justification for a strong public domain. The other half springs from
realizing that authorship is not a lonely endeavor in which a single person cre-
ates an entire work from her imagination alone.
Locke's justification of property in the fruits of a person's labor is premised
on an assumption that the laborer is the only person who can claim credit for
those fruits. Locke reasons by analogizing to a laborer's ostensibly just claim of
property in acorns she gathers.22 But for the laborer, the acorns would never
have been gathered. Since no one else can claim to have gathered the acorns,
the laborer's claim is exclusive and complete.
Similarly, the argument which supports an author's broad property in her
work follows from an assumption that the author labors alone to produce her
work. The author alone conceives of the work, develops its ideas, and brings the
work to fruition. The finished work captures the author's original mental prod-
uct. Thus, the author's claim to property in her work is even more complete and
total as the laborer's claim in her acorns.22 7
Brief reflection reveals the flaw in this assumption. Unlike Locke's gatherer
of acorns, authors do not truly labor alone. Although it is certainly true that
authors are extremely gifted and industrious, the popular vision of authors as
people who create new things from nothing is simply false. No author has lived
an entire life on a proverbial desert island. Instead, authors live and work as
members of an artistic community and a broader society whose creations, values
and experiences form an integral part of the author's creative vision. Authorship
is therefore not the creation of works which spring like Athena from the head of
Zeus, but the conscious and unconscious intake, digestion and transformation of
input gained from the author's experience within a broader society.228 Works of
authorship therefore capture more than the author's personality alone. They
capture a combination of the author's personality, the society in which she
lives,229 and the works of other authors. 30 This reliance on borrowed material
has powerful implications for the strength of the author's claim of complete
226. J. LOCKE, supra note 38, at § 28.
227. Cf. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *405 (describing copyright as peculiarly the subject of labor and
occupancy). To some extent, this vision is enforced by our present low standard of originality.
228. Litman, supra note 24.
229. A good example of this is our recognition of Mozart's music as both "Mozartean" and German in its
personality. Similarly, Renoir and Monet can be identified as both individuals and French. Cf. PLANTINGA, Ro-
MANTIC Music 362-89 (1984) (characterizing the music of Glinka, Borodin, Mussorgsky, Rimsky-Korsakov and
Tchaikovsky as both distinctly Russian and individual).
230. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436):
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an
abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows,
and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before. . . . No man writes
exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of
every man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have thought and expressed, although they
may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection.
Brief consideration of one's own work should prove the essential truth of this proposition. The honest legal scholar
must admit that his arguments, conceptions, methods of analysis, writing style, and terminology is heavily influ-
enced, if not directly formed, by the writings of others. Similarly, composers use sounds they have heard before,
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control over her work, for it provides the factual basis on which to construct a
strong public domain.
The clearest justification for a public domain occurs when material is bor-
rowed from society without restatement. In this situation, the Lockean implica-
tion is clear. Since the author's property rights depend on her status as the
creative source for the material, the author's right to control a work must be
limited so as not to result in property rights over material she did not create. To
the extent that this material already belongs to the public, it should remain in
the public domain.
In the case of material which is borrowed and restated, the case for limit-
ing the author's rights is less clear, but equally sound. As noted previously,
complete authors' rights seem appealing if we adhere to the notion that an au-
thor conceives, develops and creates a work out of nothing with no assistance
from others. Under this very unique assumption one can successfully argue that
a work captures the product of the author's mind, and nothing else. Once this
assumption is broken, the argument for unlimited author's rights collapses. To
the extent that the author has restated the material that she has borrowed, the
best that she can claim is a limited property right.
Consider a work in which an innocent person is convicted of a crime and
imprisoned. Even if this work is fictional, it does not fit the popular model of
something from nothing. Rather, the work captures both the the products of
society (the plot) and the author (the rewriting of the plot). Under these condi-
tions, granting the author the right to control all copying from the work is cer-
tainly unjustified because future writers who stumbled across the work and
wanted to borrow the public plot would be prohibited from doing so. This prob-
lem obviously requires limiting the author's rights to something significantly less
than the complete rights which are traditionally associated with natural law in
copyright. This can be done only by placing parts of the author's work in the
public domain.2 31
Up to now, our construction of the public domain follows the frank recog-
nition that every work contains material which neither the author nor other
individuals can claim as original work. This leaves the question of how copy-
right should treat the remaining material in an author's work. A superficial
natural law analysis would probably conclude that copyright protects all of this
material. To the extent that the work's author originated the material, copy-
right protects it on the author's behalf. To the extent that the material is bor-
writers recycle plots, and computer programmers use logic and techniques that they have seen before. See also
Litman, supra note 24.
231. In other words, others have the right to copy some portions of the author's work. In defining the scope of
borrowing, courts must remain cognizant of the possibility that the author's original material may be inseparable
from public domain material. In these cases, the doctrine of merger should be applied so that the public domain is
not privately appropriated through copyright. In other words, the public domain is actually augmented by denying
property rights in original material. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelers v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
Additional natural law support for this proposition comes from the famous Lockean proviso. In that passage,
Locke denies the existence of property in the fruits of a person's labor where the appropriation fails to leave
"enough and as good" for others. J. LOCKE, supra note 38, at § 27.
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rowed from others, the author has presumably committed copyright infringe-
ment against those persons.
Upon first consideration, this scheme appears fair and just. After all, those
authors who create original material should receive property rights in their cre-
ations. Those who borrow those creations should pay compensation. Thus, copy-
right should ruthlessly protect an author's right to prevent any borrowing of his
creative products. Copyright's public domain should therefore contain only ma-
terial which no person can claim as original. However, closer consideration of
this position reveals its flaws, for a public domain which includes original cre-
ations is in fact preferable to a public domain which does not.
Under complete authors' rights, an author would receive compensation
from any successor who borrowed from the author's work.2 32 However, our au-
thor would also owe huge debts to her predecessors for any material she might
have borrowed from them. The magnitude of this debt is apparent when one
considers how difficult an author's task would be if people really did have com-
plete property rights in their intellectual products. For starters, a hypothetical
writer would have no right to use many literary techniques or language itself. If
our author were a composer, other individuals would already claim exclusive
rights to basic musical forms and styles such as the sonata form, impressionism,
and the like. A painter would surely confront similar problems when drawing
inspiration from the works of others. Indeed, if property rights in all products of
the mind really were complete, practically all of mankind's intellectual heritage
would be private property. Future authors would simply have little, if any,
chance of achieving any sort of viable art. If nothing else, the cost of compen-
sating all sources for material borrowed would bankrupt any author. The
problems of "reinventing the wheel" would be simply overwhelming. a3
When seen in this light, the argument for complete authors' rights falters
again. If existing authors gain the power to prohibit all borrowing from their
works, the problem of how these authors should compensate their predecessors
immediately occurs. However, no system of payment will work. First, the prob-
lem of how much compensation should be paid guarantees a legal nightmare.
Second, and more importantly, identification of the proper parties to compen-
sate is impossible. Even if an author could identify the sources from whom she
had borrowed,234 the problem immediately replicates itself as those sources at-
tempt to identify the persons from whom they borrowed.235
The solution to this problem is to limit the property claims of authors in
their works by creating a vigorous public domain which contains original mate-
232. Under a complete authors' rights view, any borrowing from a work would violate the author's natural
rights. The logical consequence is that future individuals would owe compensation to authors from whose works
they chose to borrow.
233. Cf. Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 511 (1945) ("A dwarf
standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant himself."). The work of modern psychologists
also suggests the importance of copying in artistic achievement. Cf. H. GARDNER, ARTFUL SCRIBBLES 164-91
(1980).
234. This possibility is highly unlikely. The notion that sources for unconscious borrowing could be identified
is particularly absurd. See Litman, supra note 24.
235. Ignoring the problem is not a justifiable option. If existing authors profit by extracting royalties from
future authors while paying no royalties to their predecessors, a form of unjustified enrichment results.
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rial. This course of action solves, in a general way, the problem of whom and
how much to pay. Since the identification of one prior author as a person to be
compensated merely raises the problem of identifying more persons, it quickly
becomes clear that practically every author would both owe and be owed com-
pensation under a complete property rights scheme. This implies that society
could more fairly "balance the books" among all authors by simply recognizing
the fact that authors will always owe a great deal to each other and letting it go
at that. In other words, society should forgive many of the "debts" owed by
modern authors to their predecessors. In return for this windfall, modern au-
thors should forgive similar debts to future authors. The effect of such a scheme
would be to place even original material into a public domain from which future
authors could borrow and to which they must contribute. 86
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the complete vindication of au-
thors' property claims is not the necessary consequence of restoring natural law
to our copyright thinking. Indeed, once we recognize the true nature of author-
ship, the moral force behind originality as the justification for complete authors'
rights disappears. Instead, serious limits on copyright's reach appear.2 37 Of
course, these limits do not imply that an author's property claims should be
ignored. Authors certainly create material in which they deserve property
rights. The point is that the property rights authors deserve under natural law
are neither unlimited nor perpetual. Many copyright claims must be denied be-
cause they imply the privatization of public domain material. More importantly,
even if property rights are recognized, it is entirely appropriate to restrict those
rights to a limited number of years, thereby eventually dedicating the entire
work to the public domain. 23 8
236. For a discussion of the concept of reciprocity, see Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 1165, 1222-24 (1967); Gordon, supra note 3, at 1463-64. The equitable contribution of authors to the
public domain could be achieved in two ways. First, portions of every work should be dedicated to the public
domain immediately upon creation. These portions should include those which are both likely to have been bor-
rowed and are likely to be borrowed in the future. A good example in modern copyright is the doctrine of scenes a
faire, which places trite plots, scenes and sequences into the public domain. See, e.g., Schwarz v. Universal Pic-
tures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
Although these trite devices may sometimes be original, the likelihood of their having been borrowed and their use
by future authors makes their immediate inclusion in the public domain fair. Second, all works should receive
copyright protection for a limited time only, thereby ensuring eventual dedication to the public domain while
providing a fair vindication of the author's creative labor. Such a result exists under 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1978),
which terminates copyright fifty years after the author's death.
237. Indeed, in Professor Litman's view, a serious jurisprudence of originality would destroy the copyright-
ability of most works. See Litman, supra note 24.
238. The possibility of limiting copyright by applying concepts such as originality and by restricting copy-
right's duration creates an interesting natural law balance. Since the extent of any property right is positively
related to both the number of the substantive rights and their duration, it follows that broad substantive rights
which last for a short while are comparable to narrow substantive rights which last for a long time. Thus, the
breadth of the rights granted to authors should be inversely proportional to the length of copyright's term. A
modern court interpreting our copyright statute must therefore be mindful of the fact that copyright presently
lasts for the life of the author plus fifty years. In my view, the long length of copyright implies that the substantive
rights authors can claim should be quite limited. By contrast, the comparatively short seventeen-year term of
patent may justify the somewhat broader rights granted under the patent law. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988)
with 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1981).
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has advocated the restoration of natural law to our copyright
jurisprudence by making three separate, but related, arguments. First, the Arti-
cle pointed out the descriptive shortcomings of our economic copyright model.
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, copyright's history and doctrine bear the un-
mistakable marks of natural law. Second, the Article showed that economics
alone cannot serve as copyright's sole normative touchstone. Theories beyond
economics are required to address the practical and theoretical problems which
beset the normative use of economics. Third, we should use natural law because
it is already imbedded in our copyright concepts and because it is capable of
justifying an initial assignment of rights through copyright law.
Of course, the suggested restoration of natural law does not mean that eco-
nomic analysis of copyright should be abandoned. Copyright has undeniable ec-
onomic consequences. It is entirely appropriate that we should use the insights
of economics to understand how copyright affects the lives of authors and con-
sumers. However, we must also remind ourselves that the economic effects of
copyright must, in the end, be justified by principles beyond the realm of eco-
nomics. We must identify the natural law insights which guide how the eco-
nomic institution of copyright should be shaped.239 This course of action will
undoubtedly open new avenues of inquiry into copyright law.
First, society must decide just what kind of rights an author's labor will
support. Since copyright properly depends on the author's ability to claim a
work as her original product, we must learn how to identify material which is
truly created by the author. This will require theories of how the creative mind
works. Psychological studies may offer great insight here. Similarly, identifying
material which is the product of the author's culture requires some vision of
how a society creates and adopts certain creative expressions as its own. Liter-
ary, artistic and sociological theories will undoubtedly prove useful here. Addi-
tionally, philosophical issues such as fairness and the distribution of property
within our society must be discussed so we can evaluate the question of just how
much intellectual property a single author deserves.
Second, society must explore and resolve the conflicts between rights based
upon an author's labor and the other rights of individuals. For example, copy-
right scholars have already identified conflicts between the first amendment and
copyright. To the extent that copyright hinders the ability of future authors to
express themselves, their free speech has been diminished.140 A similar conflict
exists between an author's right to property and other individuals' right to par-
239. See Brown, supra note 23, at 607 (arguing that a combination of authors' rights and economic analysis
is the optimal way to analyze copyright); Dreyfuss, supra note 23 (analyzing the work made for hire doctrine by
merging author-based and economic approaches).
240. See Yen, supra note 17. See also Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations of
the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70
COLUi. L. REV. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19
COPYRIGHT LAW SymP. 43 (1971).
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ticipate and share in the intellectual life of society.2 " Finally, a conflict exists
between copyright and privacy. 2
Of course, there is no guarantee that any of these inquiries will ultimately
prove successful. The uncertainty, difficulty and discomfort of breaking away
from the familiar economic copyright model will create great pressure to retain
the jurisprudential status quo. However, holding fast to the status quo is not a
truly viable option. As this Article has shown, the solely economic interpretation
of copyright creates ambiguity which courts cannot resolve by further economic
study. Thus, the status quo forces courts to justify their decisions as a matter of
economics when economics cannot provide the desired support. Confidence in
the judiciary may erode as doctrine is exposed as unjustified. Even worse, when
courts necessarily proceed by resolving economic ambiguities on the basis of
noneconomic (i.e. natural law) principles, our refusal to explicitly develop a nat-
ural law copyright jurisprudence means that courts lack well reasoned prece-
dent on which to base their decisions. The absence of adequate guidance renders
the climate ripe for arbitrary and unwise judicial decision making.
In short, we should learn a valuable lesson from the early Americans who
realized that copyright has solid roots in both economics and natural law. To be
sure, we have gained many useful insights through our modern loyalty to eco-
nomics. However, we must also recognize the fact that the creation and assign-
ment of property rights raise questions of value and morality that cannot be
answered or avoided by appealing to efficiency. Whether we like it or not, copy-
right greatly affects the intellectual world in which we live. How we choose to
shape that world can be resolved only by considering basic notions of what is
fair and just.243 Because of this, the proper future construction of our copyright
law depends on the restoration of its natural law heritage.
241. This conflict is posed in article 27 of the Declaration of Human Rights. That article provides:
(I) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and
to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scien-
tific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27 (quoted in S.M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND, NEIGHBOUR-
ING RIGHTS 5 (1983)).
242. The case of Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), illustrates this
point. In that case, the Supreme Court held that home videotaping of copyrighted television programs for purposes
of time shifting was a fair use. Although the case was not decided on privacy grounds, its facts lend themselves to
a privacy analysis because time shifting occurs within the putative infringer's home. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) (affording constitutional protection for the private in-home possession of obscenity); Carter,
Copyright Protection, the Right to Privacy, and Signals that Enter the Home, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 289
(1984).
243. See PA. SAMUELSON. ECON OMIcs 8 (6th ed. 1955) ("Basic questions concerning right and wrong goals
to be pursued cannot be settled by [economies] as such. They belong in the realm of ethics and 'value judg-
ments. "); Heyne, The Foundations of Law and Economics: Can the Blind Lead the Blind?, in REs. IN. LAW &
EcoN., vol. 11, at 53, 65 (1988) ("Efficiency and fairness are complements, not substitutes. Each helps to repair
the ultimate indeterminacy of the other. We do not have to repudiate fairness to obtain help from efficiency; nor
must we forgo the assistance that efficiency considerations provide in our groping for fairness.").
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